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CHAPTER 
I I T R O D U C T I O W 
Despite the a l l pervasive nature and influence of 
work, serious study of work behaviour i s a very recent 
phenomenon. The chief h i s t o r i c a l event, which grea t ly 
influenced the study of human work and the problems man 
faces in performing i t was, of course, the Indus t r ia l 
Revolution. I t not only brought about several long-term 
effects on the nature of work i t s e l f , but also created a 
host of new problems in i t s wske. 
As one of the most s t r ik ing effects , modern 
industry has transformed work from a la rge ly pr ivate a c t i -
v i ty to a predominantly public one. Millions of people who 
had h i ther to spent t he i r en t i r e working l i v e s as farmers, 
hunters, pas to ra l s , or individual craftsmen, Indust r ia l 
Revolution brought them together in large work groups, where 
t h e i r work behaviour was under almost continuous observation 
and c o n t r o l . 
Mother major consequence of the Indus t r i a l 
Revolution and the development of the factory system and a 
money economy required a kind of worker who was not t i e d to 
a p lot of land, but was r e l a t i v e l y free and mobile, who was 
i n effect , the sole owner and disposer of his a b i l i t y to 
work and who was free to s e l l h is ab i l i t y in an open labour 
maricet. The establishment of the free worker crea ted a new 
problem : the source of the individual motivation to work. 
The f i r s t e f for t to carry out a s c i en t i f i c study 
of work behaviour were focused exclusively on work simply as 
a technical fac tor in the process of production. These 
inves t igat ions began at almost the turn of th i s century and 
were designed en t i r e ly to serve the i n t e r e s t s of e f f ic ien t 
factory management. P.W.(Taylor (1911) i s the recognized 
pioneer in what has come to be known as time-and-motion 
study or Scient if ic Management, a type of analysis of task 
performance, so that there i s an over a l l increase in produc-
t ion of goods and services at a lower cost to the management. 
The modem spec ia l i ty of i ndus t r i a l engineering i s l a rge ly 
concerned with the most eff icient deployment and organization 
of the r e l a t ions between man and machines. There i s now 
almost as much i n t e r e s t in adapting the machine to pa r t i cu l a r 
cha r ac t e r i s t i c s of the human machine-tender as in adapting 
the human being to the machine. 
One of the important, although unintended outcomes 
of i n d u s t r i a l engineering has been the recognition tha t human 
work cannot be eas i ly reduced to so many quanta of mental and 
muscular energy. Work, after a l l , i s performed by human 
beings, who bring into the work-place not only t h e i r i n t e -
l l e c t u a l and motor s k i l l s but also t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s . 
Not u n t i l the ear ly l930's was i t recognized tha t the 
a t t i t udes , motivations, and personal i ty of the worker might 
be qui te as important a condition of work as the manner in 
which work was organized or the pa r t i cu l a r conditions of 
i l luminat ion and ven t i l a t ion . 
Work is a social phenomenon tha t must be understood 
in the context of social i n s t i t u t i o n s and s t ruc tu res . But 
work i s performed by individual human beings, not s o c i e t i e s . 
Most people in most soc ie t ies must some how come to terms 
with the deaands of work, but the manner i n which each person 
meets th i s demand is a problem in individual psychology. A 
complete p ic ture of human work must be based on the under-
standing that the conditions which influence i t are not only 
socia l and h i s t o r i c a l , but also individual and personal . 
One indisputable source of the desire of people to 
woik, i s the money they are paid for working. Although many 
people w i l l disagree with the c l a s s i ca l "economic man", fe^ 
would dispute the importance of ant icipated economic rewards 
in the guidance of human conduct. Despite the old saying 
that "money c a n ' t buy happiness", i t can be exchanged for 
many commodities which are necessary for survival and comfort. 
The widespread i n t e r e s t in money as a motivational tool for 
supUrring production was stimulated by F.W.Taylor. He 
thought tha t a worker could be made to produce more on the 
job which would lead to higher prof i t s from lower fixed 
cos t s , which in turn could be used to pay the worker s ign i -
f i can t ly more for h i s increased e f fo r t s . Such was the 
beginning of 'Sc ient i f ic MaJiagement', which is based 
es sen t i a l l y on the assumption tha t workers wi l l put for th 
ex t ra effort on the job to maximize t h e i r economic gains. 
This became a guiding pr inciple in pay prac t ices u n t i l the 
l a t e 1920's when the 'human re la t ions moment' in. i ndus t r i a l 
psychology was ushered in with the Western Electr ic s tudies 
directed by Elton Mayo. As a r e su l t of these s tud ies , 
recognition of man's ega and socia l needs became widespread, 
and job factors other than pay came to be emphasized as the 
major reasons why men work. l e t , few would disagree that 
money has been and continues to be the primary meaas of 
rewarding and modifying human behaviour in industry. 
Wages represent an almost universal form of 
inducement for individuals to perfoim work. Most workers 
receive some kind of economic ronuneration for working and 
foitnal organizations develop complex systems for determining 
the smount of remuneration payable to an individual worker. 
IThe s ize of a workers' weekly or monthly pay cheque i s 
typ ica l ly a complex resu l tan t of a large number of factors 
including the in t r i n s i c content of his job, the r e l a t ive 
supply and demand for that job , the workers' s en io r i ty and 
h i s l eve l of perfoimance. 
The point of i n t e r e s t and importance here i s the 
effect of wages or the size of the pay packet in determining 
a worker's job sa t i s f ac t ion and the probabi l i ty that he w i l l 
remain in his job . Economists and many executives are prone 
to s t r e s s the importance of the pay cheque, the more the 
amount of wages given ttie more s a t i s f i ed the woricer feels 
and wi l l want to remain on his job. But the socia l s c i e n t i s t s 
associated with the "human re la t ions" movement typ ica l ly view 
economic factors as highly over emphasized and s t r e s s the 
importance of the s a t i s f ac t ion of social and ego needs. 
Both s ides can find some support for t h e i r pos i t i on . 
In a study by Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell ( l957), 
workers were asked to rank different aspects of the work ro le 
in teims of t h e i r importance, wages tended to be ra te§ as 
l e s s important than secur i ty , opportunity for advancement, 
and company and management po l i c i e s , but as more important 
than job content, supervision, and benef i t s . However, when 
they were asked to describe what makes them s a t i s f i e d or 
d i s sa t i s f i ed with t he i r jobs, wages are found to be the most 
frequent source of d i s sa t i s f ac t ion but the l e a s t frequent 
source of s a t i s f a c t i o n . But here the c r i t e r i a was worker's 
descr ipt ion of t he i r motivations, which cannot be heavily 
r e l i e d upon. 
When one considers cor re la t iona l evidence, there 
i s some data showing that income level is pos i t ive ly asso-
c ia ted with job s a t i s f a c t i o n . Several follow up s tudies of 
col lege graduates, l i k e those conducted by Thompson, 1939; 
Mil ler , 1941; Bamett , Handelsman, Stewart and Super, l952; 
provide support for such a r e l a t i onsh ip . Lawler and Porter 
(1963 ) determined the level of wages received by almost 
2000 managers and found tha t th i s variable was pos i t ive ly 
r e l a t ed to sa t i s f ac t ion with wages, managerial l eve l held 
constant . M inves t iga t ion conducted by Smith and Kendall 
(1963) reported a cor re la t ion of .78 between the mean annual 
earnings of men in 21 plants and t h e i r mean 30b sa t i s f ac t ion 
as measured by the Job Descriptive Index. On the other hand 
Hoppock (i955) reported no s igni f icant difference in average 
earnings between one hundred we l l - sa t i s f i ed aid one hundred 
poor ly-sa t i s f ied teachers matched for age and sex. The 
l a t t e r ' s r e su l t s probably re f lec t the r e l a t i v e l y r e s t r i c t e d 
range of wages received by 3?espondents in his study. 
Mother p o s s i b i l i t y that has been suggested i s 
t h a t sa t i s f ac t ion stemming from the receipt of wages i s 
dependent not on the absolute ^oun t of these wages, but on 
the re la t ionship between that amount and some standard of 
comparison used by the ind iv idua l . The standard may be an 
adaptation level (Helson, 1947) derived from wages received 
at previous times or a conception of the amount of wages 
received by other people. 
!Phe l a t t e r of these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s has been 
most thoroughly explored. Patchen ( l96l) formulated the 
problem of sa t i s fac t ion with wages in teims of social 
comparison theory. He assumed that individuals compare 
t he i r own earnings with those of others in terms of t h e i r 
r e l a t ive standing on dimensions believed to be the basis of 
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pay (e .g . s k i l l , sen ior i ty , and educat ion) . Sat is fact ion 
with a specific -wage comparison was hypothesized to he a 
function of the object ive dissonance of the comparison. A 
comparison i s termed objectively dissonant by Patchen when 
the r a t i o of the comparer's pos i t ion on dimensions relevant 
to pay to another 's posi t ion on these dimensions i s cu l tu -
r a l l y considered congruent with or appropriate to the r a t i o 
of t h e i r earnings. Thus, i f one person compared himself with 
another person who was earning more but who was s imi lar in 
h is standing on dimensions re la ted to p ^ , the comparison 
would be dissonant and would be expected to lead to d i s s a t i s -
fact ion on the part of the comparer. Likewise, i f he compared 
himself to someone who was earning the same but who was 
i n f e r i o r in standing on dimensions r e l a t ed to pay, the 
comparison would also be object ively dissonant and accompa-
nied by d i ssa t i s fac t ion . On the other hand, if a person 
compared himself to someone who was earning more and who was 
super ior on dimensions related to pay, or to someone who was 
earning the same and was similar on dimensions r e l a t ed to 
pay, i t would be object ively consonant and would be expected 
to r e su l t in sa t i s fac t ion . 
Evidence in support of the predicted re la t ionship 
between the dissonance of wage comparisons and sa t i s fac t ion 
has been obtained by Patchen ( i96l ) in a study of workers in 
an o i l r e f ine ry . These findings support the long held 
contention of many personnel managers that sa t i s f ac t ion i s 
dependent on r e l a t i v e ra ther than absolute wage l e v e l s . 
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According to the oognitive model proposed by YixDom 
(1964), the a t t rac t iveness of a work ro le for a person i s 
d i r ec t l y r e l a t ed to the extent to which i t provides him with 
rewarding outcomes and inversely re la ted to the extent to 
which i t provides him with aversive outcomes. Ihus, i f money 
cons t i tu tes a reward for a person then the more money he 
makes from his work the more a t t rac ted he w i l l he to his work 
r o l e . If re ject ion by other people cons t i tu tes an aversive 
outcome, then the more he i s re jected by his co-workers the 
l e s s a t t rac ted he w i l l be to his work r o l e . 
A somewhat different point of view i s represented 
in the assumption that persons do not s t r ive to maximize the 
attainment of desired outcomes l i k e money but r a the r s t r i ve 
to obtain an equitable or f a i r amount. Basic to t h i s posi t ion 
i s the bel ief that individuals are guided by a moral system 
which has as a basic tenet the f a i r d i s t r i bu t ion of rewards. 
If a person receives l ess than a f a i r amount he feels tha t 
an in jus t i ce has been done to him, i f he receives more than 
the f a i r amount he feels gu i l ty . 
In effect, th i s point of view regards job s a t i s -
fact ion as a function of the amount of differences between 
the amount of reward that the person believes he should 
receive and the amount of reward which in fact he does receive . 
The greater the difference between these two amounts, the 
greater the tension or disequilibrium e3q)erienced by the 
persons. 
Although suoh a model may be applicable to any 
dimensions of reward, i t i s most frequently regarded as 
applicable to wages . All systems of wage aad salary adminis-
t r a t i o n contain the impl ic i t assumption that there i s a f a i r 
and equitable level of compensation for each worker on each 
job . Jaques (.1961) has provided a psychological basis for 
th i s assumption with his hypothesis that a s t a t e of d i s -
equilibrium i s created within a person whenever his actual 
level of payment deviates from the equitable l eve l s regard-
l e s s of the d i rec t ion of the d ispar i ty . -According to t h i s 
hypothesis, i f a person believes tha t he should receive a 
salary of fSs .200/- per month but in fact receives Rs.i50/- per 
month, he w i l l experience feelings of tension and inequity 
and s t r i v e to reduce the discrepancy. If the same person 
receives a sa lary of Its.250/- per month he wi l l also experience 
tension and inequity and seek to reduce the discrepancy-
Jacques, through the inves t iga t ion he car r ied out on super-
visors and manual workers in s ix different Br i t i sh firms, 
professes to have uncovered "the existence of an unrecognized 
system of norms of f a i r payment for any given leve l of work, 
unconscious knowledge of these norms being shared among the 
population engaged in employment work" (page 124)' 
Zalezmik, Christensen and Eocthlisberger (1958)^ 
also studied the effects of wage inequity on worker s a t i s -
fact ion. They t r i e d to infer what woifcers should regai'd as 
equitable pay from t h e i r age, sen ior i ty , education, e thn ic i ty . 
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and sex, a l l of which are assumed to ind ica te the extent of 
t h e i r "investment" in the i r job. They predicted tha t workers 
whose degree of reward was favourable in comparison with 
t h e i r investments would express a greater degree of s a t i s -
fact ion than workers whose degree of reward was unfavourable 
in r e l a t i o n to t he i r investments. To t e s t t h i s predic t ion , 
they constructed a reward-investment index and obtained a 
score for each of 47 workera. The index was ini^ended to 
express the difference between what the workers received 
from the i r jobs and what they invested in i t . Contrary to 
predic t ion , sa t i s f ac t ion scores were not associated with 
scores on t h i s reward - investment index. However, the 
authors acknowledge the weakness in t h i s crude t e s t and tend 
to regard t h i s finding as due to methodological incadequacies 
ra ther than to defects in the i r theory. 
A more elaborate and detai led conception of equity 
has appeared in recent wr i t i ngs . Equity and i t s opposite, 
inequi ty , are defined in r e l a t i v e ra ther than absolute terms. 
Inequity i s assumed to r e s u l t , not from a discrepancy between 
rewards received from and investments made in one 's job, but 
from discrepancies in the r e l a t i v e magnitudes of rewards and 
investments of a person and those of other person with yhome 
he compares himself. AQ ind iv idua l ' s perceptions of rewards 
and investments of others i s t h o u ^ t to provide him with a 
standard against which he judges the fa i rness and equity of 
rewards which he himself r ece ives . We wi l l have more to say 
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about th i s concept of inequity l a t t e r . 
AQotber f i e ld where wages play an important pa r t , 
i s t he i r effect on worker's motivation to perform t h e i r jobs 
e f fec t ive ly . One p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the strength of a 
worker's motivation to perform effect ively i s d i r ec t ly 
r e l a t ed to the amount of his wages. The more wages he 
receives the higher h is motivation to do an effect ive job . 
There i s l i t t l e evidence i n support of such a r e l a t i onsh ip . 
There i s no r e l i ab l e data indicat ing tha t increases in wages 
increases level of performance or that decreases in wages 
decreases leve l of performance. 
Adsms theory of equity (l963, a) , has implications 
for tile effect of amount ot wages on worker p2x>dUGtivity. 
According to Jihis theory, the employment re la t ionsh ip i s a 
case of an exchange between an employer and employee. The 
employee exchanges his services for pay from the employer. 
On the employee's side of the exchange are his "inputs" -
education, esjserience, t r a in ing , s k i l l , in te l l igence , sex, 
age, sen ior i ty , ethnic background, socia l s t a t u s , and the 
ef for t he expends on the job. On the employer's side of the 
exchange are the "outcomes" or rewards provided to the 
employee for h i s se rv ices . These include pay, rewards 
i n t r i n s i c to the job, securi ty benef i ts , fringe benef i ts 
and s ta tus symbols. 
Inequity i s said to exis t for an employee 
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"whenever his perceived job inputs and/or outcomes stand 
psychologically in an obverse r e l a t i o n to what he perceives 
are the inputs and/or outcomes of o thers" , (Adsras, 1963). 
If a person's inputs exceed those of other, but h i s outcomes 
are the same or l e s s , then inequity e x i s t s . Similarly, i f 
a person 's inputs are l e s s than those of other,^' but h is out-
comes are greater or sane, inequi ty also e x i s t s . In computing 
the amount of inequi ty exis t ing in a given person - other 
re la t ionsh ip , Adams, employs the following mathematical 
formula : 
Inequity = / (pe r son ' s inputs - person 's outcomes) 
- (o ther ' s inputs - o the r ' s outcomes)/. 
According to th i s theory, workers s t r i v e to a t t a in 
an equitable re la t ionship between the i r job inputs and 
outcomes and those of "^other^. If a worker believes that he 
i s overpaid re la t ive to others with the same inputs , he i s 
predicted to experience feelings of inequity and t e i s i o n 
which he will t ry to reduce. One means of doing th i s i s to 
increase his inputs to his job which may include increasing 
h i s level of performance. Similarly, i f he believes tha t he 
i s being underpaid re la t ive to other with the same inputs , 
he I s predicted to experience feel ings of inequity and 
tension which could be reduced by cfecreasing h is l e v e l of 
perfonnanee . 
; The way a person reduces the feel ing of inequity 
and tension may vary from person to person and for a 
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pa r t i cu l a r person over time, but can include any one or a 
combination of the following : ( i ) d i s to r t ing one's own or 
the o the r ' s inputs and/or outcomes; (2) withdrawing from the 
s i t ua t i on and (3 ) changing the comparison against whom he 
compares h i s input-outcome r a t i o . Which of these methods 
w i l l be choosen ? Adams pred ic t s tha t the person w i l l choose 
whichever method is e a s i e s t . I t should be noted that t h i s 
theory doesnot predic t that increases in wages w i l l necessar i ly 
resu l t in increased productivi ty or tha t decreased wages w i l l 
necessar i ly resu l t in decreased product iv i ty . Productivi ty 
changes would be expected only when changes in wages affects 
worker's feel ings regarding the equity of t h e i r wages in 
r e l a t i on to those of ^others'. 
Existing evidence provides support for these 
p red ic t ions . Adams and Rosenbaum (l962) car r ied out 2 
experiments, t h e i r resu l t s indicate tha t unqualified Ss 
produced more than qual i f ied Ss when paid hourly. Unquali-
f ied piece rate Ss produced l e s s than qual i f ied piece rate 
Ss. Garlfflid (l973 ) t e s t ed two hypotheses derived from 
equity theory, in general, the r e su l t s support the hsrpo-
theses . Although a person on piece-work, who believes he 
i s being overcompensated cannot reduce h i s feelings of 
inequi ty by increasing the quanti ty of his performance, 
he can accoii5)lish the same effect by improving the qua l i ty 
of h i s work. This poss ib i l i ty was invest igated and found 
to be t rue by an experiment carr ied out by Adams and 
Jacobsen (l%4). 
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Goodman, and Friedman (l969); Moors and Baron 
(1973); Wilke and Steur (l972); are some other inves t iga tors 
who support the assumptions of equity theory as re la ted to 
work performance and work qua l i t y . 
Recent invest igators have studied inequity or 
equity and different factors re la ted to i t by using the 
a l locat ion of reward method. Social work se t t ings are often 
so constructed tha t a work group consis t ing of two or more 
receives a reward according to the group member's combined 
achievement. The following two methods predominate among 
the various p o s s i b i l i t i e s for dividing the reward in such 
s i tua t ions : (a) The reward is equally divided among the 
pa r tne r s , disregarding individual performance (equa l i ty ) , 
(b) The reward i s divided according to the contr ibut ion of 
each individual member of the to t a l group output (equ i ty ) . 
Every socia l system contains rewards and resources 
tha t are used to achieve group goals and sa t i s fy individual 
needs. Maabers of the system occupy different roles in 
r e l a t i o n to these rewards and resources. Some individuals 
serve as a l loca tors who dispense them while other individuals 
are r ec ip i en t s . The a l loca to r ' s decisions regarding the 
d i s t r ibu t ion of reward and resources i s influenced by his 
superiors or subordinates also other pa r t i e s who observe the 
a l loca to r . 
In any work group the problems emanate from the 
task environment and the interpersonal environment within 
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the group (Bales, 1950; Homans, 1950; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). 
Rewards and resources serve three main functions in r e l a t i on 
to these problems, namely : ( i ) resources are required for 
the conduct of a c t i v i t i e s that solve task or socio-emotional 
problems; (2) rewards reinforce and strengthen rec ip ient 
behaviour that contr ibutes to the solut ion of these problems; 
(3) rewards and resources make group membership a t t r a c t i v e 
to rec ip ien t s and strengthens t h e i r loya l ty . 
Adams (l963, 1965) equity theory suggests tha t 
aVv eXlocAtov w i l l del iver rewards and resources to r ec ip ien t s 
in proportion to the usefulness of t he i r ac t ion . Numerous 
s tudies confirm t h i s basic implication of the model (Lane & 
Messe,^ 1971; Lane, Mssse, and H i i l l i p s , l97l ; Leventhal and 
Michaels, 1969, l 9 7 l ) . The equity model i den t i f i e s important 
psychological processes and causal variables tha t must be 
taken in to account in the study of a l locat ion behaviour. 
However, by i t s e l f , the model provides too l imi ted a framework 
for a comprehensive analysis of a l locat ion behaviour. Adans' 
(l965) s ta teaent of equity theory and Walster, Berscheid, 
and Walster (l973) recent restatement of the theory, deals 
pr imari ly with the influence of a s ingle normative rule 
which d i c t a t e s that rewards and resources be d is t r ibu ted in 
accordance with rec ip ients contr ibut ion. However, many other 
motivational and cognitive factors influence an a l l o c a t o r ' s 
decision, for example, the rule of equity i s only one of 
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several possible norms the a l locator may fallow. Thus, 
ins tead of rewarding rec ip ients in accordance with the i r 
inputs , an a l locator may follow a rule of a l locat ing in 
accordance with t h e i r needs or a rule of equal d i s t r i bu t ion . 
Allocation decisions are instrumental acts through 
which the al locator t r i e s to achieve various goals , i l l o c a -
t ion norms cons t i tu te one important c lass of such motivational 
f a c t o r s , in ' a l loca t ion norm' may be defined as a social 
rule which specif ies c r i t e r i a tha t define ce r t a in d i s t r ibu-
t ions of rewards and resources as f a i r and j u s t . Lemer 
(1974 a, b) and Pru i t t (l972) suggest, an a l loca tor may 
fdllow a number of a l te rna t ive a l locat ion norms. For example, 
he may follow a rale of equity and d i s t r ibu te rewards and 
r s o u r c e s in accordance with recipients* contr ibut ions; 
follow a norm of equali ty and give a l l r ec ip ien t s the same, 
regardless of t h e i r contr ibut ions; follow a norm of rec ipro-
c i t y and t r e a t rec ipients as they have t r ea ted him; follow 
norms of responsiveness to need and give more to rec ip ients 
with greater need; or follow a norm of "adhering to commit-
ments" and a l locate in accordance with pr ior agreements 
between himself and r ec ip i en t s . 
Typically, several allocation norms are sa l i en t at 
one time and the social system favours some a l loca t ion norms 
more than o the r s . Thus, an a l loca tors ' decision to comply 
with one al location norm ra ther than another, represents not 
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only an attempt to be f a i r and j u s t , but also an attempt to 
gain the unique pa t te rn of instrumental benefi ts t ha t i s 
associated with following that norm. 
As has already been suggested gillocator follows 
one al locat ion noitn rather than another pr imari ly because 
following that norm has beneficial e f f ec t s . Por example, 
there is reason to believe tha t equitable a l locat ion help 
fos te r high levels of task perfoimance. A large body of 
theory and research suggests tha t delivering high reward to 
good perfoimers and low reward to poor performers often 
f a c i l i t a t e s product ivi ty ( e . g . Bales, 1950; Burnstein, 1969; 
Collins and GuetzKcow, 1964; Hbmans, 1961; lawler, 1971; 
Porter and Lawler, 1968; Ste iner , l972). Numerous s tudies 
conducted in laboratory and f ie ld se t t ings indicate tha t 
reward systems which closely t i e a r e c i p i e n t ' s rewards to 
h i s performance often e l i c i t be t t e r performance (Lawler, l97l) 
I t seems l i k e l y that an i i loca tor who d i s t r ibu tes rewards 
equitably frequently does so more because he desires to 
maximize long-teim product ivi ty than because he desires to 
comply with an abstract standard of j u s t i c e . His decisions 
are based on an expectancy tha t equitable d i s t r ibu t ions of 
reward w i l l e l i c i t and susta in high levels of motivation and 
performance . 
But i t has been seen that equitable a l locat ion 
donot always fos ter high product ivi ty . Por example, rewarding 
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r ec ip ien t s in accordance with t h e i r apparent contr ibut ions 
may be counter productive i f i t is d i f f i cu l t to assess 
individual contr ibutions accurately, or i f a high leve l of 
cooperation anong rec ip ients i s essen t ia l for effective 
performance (lawler, 1971; Steiner, 1972). l l l o c a t o r s 
probably recognize that productivity i s not always f a c i l i -
t a t ed by a s t r i c t policy of re^^^arding rec ip ients i n accor-
dance with the i r contr ibut ions . Consequently, there are 
instances when an a l loca tor deviates markedly from the equity 
norm evai though his primary goal i s to e l i c i t a high leve l 
of performance. 
The fact tha t equitable a l locat ions may arouse 
negative feelings in poor performers points to the importance 
of distinguishing between al locat ion s t r a t eg i e s tha t cope with 
task problems and al locat ion s t r a teg ies t ha t cope with 
socio-emotional problems. I t has been suggested that an 
a l loca tor follows the equity norm to cope with task problems, 
i . e . to maximize r ec ip i en t s ' performance. However, s t r i c t 
adherence to the rule of equity may cause socio-eiODtional 
problems by arousing d i ssa t i s fac t ion and resentment among 
poor performers. Consequently, saa a l loca tor whose primary 
concern i s to cope with socio-emotional problems and minimize 
negative responses may often more away from adherence to the 
equi ty norm. 
The s t r iv ing for equal d i s t r ibu t ion or equal i ty in 
reward d i s t r ibu t ion in a social s e t t i ng has been emphasized 
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by Sampson ( i969). Studies by ( ^ r e t t ( l973); Kahn (l972}; 
Lane and Goon (i972); le rner (l974 a); Leventhal, Popp, and 
Sawyer (l973); Liehtman (1972); P ru i t t (1972), show tha t an 
a l loca tor sometimes ignores differences in r e c i p i e n t s ' inputs 
and d i s t r i bu t e s rewards equal ly . He i s especia l ly l i k e l y to 
follow the equal i ty norm in se t t ings in which i t i s widely 
regarded as the most appropriate rule of a l locat ion and 
others expect him to follow i t . However his decision to 
follow equal i ty i s also influenced by a desire to obtain 
ce r ta in benefi ts associated with equal d i s t r i b u t i o n . For 
example, equali ty of reward may fos te r harmoney and sol ida-
r i t y (Bales, 1950). Studies of the effect of different 
d i s t r ibu t ions of reward on intercpersonal re la t ionsh ips 
indicates t ha t equal d i s t r ibu t ions tend to produce a high 
level of sa t i s f a s t ion and haimony among group members (Jul ian 
and Perry, 1967; Smith and Cook, 1973; Ste iner , 1972). 
Consequently, the a l locator who follows the equali ty noim as 
a c r i t e r i o n of f a i r d i s t r ibu t ion i s also l i k e l y to e l i c i t a 
h i ^ level of s o l i d a r i t y . That i s why an a l loca tor often 
follows the equal i ty nozm because he believes i t helps 
resolve problems ar i s ing from the group's in terspersenal 
environment (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Homans, 1950). 
More s ign i f ican t ly , he bel ieves equal a l loca t ions reduce*--
negative socio-emotional behaviours such as d i s sa t i s fac t ion 
and antagonism. 
Thus, i f an a l loca to r ' s primary goal is to maximize 
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product ivi ty , he favours the equity norm because equitable 
a l locat ions help maximiae group product ivi ty over the long 
run. If his primary goal i s to minimize antagonism and 
maintain so l i da r i t y , he favours the equal i ty nona because 
equal a l locat ions fos te r interpersonal haiaiony. 
As the r e su l t s of different s tudies show, the 
actual HOde of d i s t r ibu t ion may depend on any number of 
fac tors , e .g . sex of the person dividing the reward 
(Leventhal and Lane, 1970; Mikula 1972 b) ; the nature of the 
p a r t n e r ' s re la t ionship (Morgan and Sayyer, 1967); the per-
formance r a t i o of the dyad (Mikula, 1972 c ) ; sexual compo-
s i t i o n of the dyad (Mikula 1972 a ) ; and expectation of future 
interr:;action on reward s i locat ion (Shapiro, 1975 ) to name a 
few. 
inequi t ies are a perennial concern of manage-
ment and labour, and are frequent cause of grievances, indeed, 
ot s t r i k e s , and may lead to lower product iv i ty , ©lese r e s u l t , 
i n anguish, f rus t ra t ion , and one might p red ic t , a host of 
psychogenic complaints, absentesism, and so on. The purpose 
of th i s inves t iga t ion is to varify the effects of socio-
economic l e v e l , emotional adjustment and l eve l of anxiety on 
the equal o r equitable d i s t r ibu t ion of rewards by co-workers 
in a t r i a d . 
CHAPTER I I 
A SURVEY OP THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
In th i s chapter the various relevant theore t i ca l 
papers are reviewed followed by the different research p ^ e r s 
published with br ief description of the task, subjec ts , 
independent and dependent variables and r e su l t s of each 
p ap e r . 
Adams (l963 a) presents a general theory of inequi ty 
based on soc ia l exchange, social comparison, and cognitive 
dissonance theor ies . He presents a theory of soc ia l inequity, 
with special consideration given to wage i nequ i t i e s . A 
special case of Pestinger's cognit ive dissonance, the theory 
specif ies the conditions under which incequity wi l l ar ise 
and the means by which i t may be reduced or el iminated. In 
t h i s paper, observational f i e ld studies supporting the theory 
and laboratory experiments designed to t e s t ce r t a in aspects 
of i t are described. 
Another theore t i ca l paper presented by Adams i n 
I.Berkowitz (Ed.), ( l965), extends equity theory f i r s t 
presented in Adams (l963 a ) . Social exchange, r e l a t i v e 
deprivation, d i s t r ibu t ive j u s t i c e , and other re la ted theories 
are discussed. 
Anderson, Berger, Zeldltch, and Oohen (l969) have 
based the i r t heore t i ca l discussion of r e l a t i v e deprivation, 
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d i s t r i bu t i ve j u s t i c e , and equity from a sociological view-
po in t . 
Blau (i964) in h i s book "Exchange and power i n 
socia l l i f e " discusses the concepts of j u s t i c e , f a i r exchange 
and d i s t r i bu t i ve jus t ice as effecting social exchange and 
fee l ing of inequi ty. 
Homans ( l96i ) presents h is theory of d i s t r ibu t ive 
j u s t i c e in his book of "Social behaviour : I t s elementary 
forms." 
Zaleznik, Christensen, and B3ethlisberger (l958) 
in t h e i r book, "The motivation, product iv i ty , and sa t i s f ac t ion 
of Workers", have discussed the theory of d i s t r ibu t ive j u s t i c e 
together with a number of i l l u s t r a t i v e cases . 
Zale2aiik and Moment (1964) in "The dynsanics of 
interpersonal behaviour", have discussed the concepts of 
d i s t r ibu t ive jus t i ce and r e l a t i v e deprivation in the condfext 
of job sa t i s f ac t ion . 
Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (l9T0) discuss 
harmdoing as producing inequity between two people. They 
have presented theory and data which predic t when a harm 
doer wi l l provide r e s t i t u t i o n to a victim and when he wi l l 
j u s t i fy h i s a c t . 
In another paper, Walster, Berscheid, and Walster 
(1975) revise , extend and generalize previous equity theory 
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and present a general theory of social behaviour. Thej have 
reviewed previous equity research and the re la t ionship of 
equity theory to other ma3or socia l psychological theor ies 
i s examined. 
The following is a review of the research papers 
presented on equity in the various journals of psychology 
and also reference i s given of ce r t a in unpublished manus-
crppts taken from "Equity Theory : Toward a General Theory 
of Social Interact ion" by Berkowitz and Walster (Ed.) ( l976) . 
Adams (l963 b) conducted three experiments using 
public interviewing as the task to be done by the subjects 
(Ss ) . His I ? : was ( i ) Ss paid at hourly or piece r a t e ; 
(2) Ss induced to feel qual i f ied or unqualified for pay r a t e 
and DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work Quali ty . The r e s u l t s 
show tha t unqualified hourly Ss' product ivi ty was higher 
than qual i f ied hourly paid Ss . Unqualified piece r a t e Ss 
work qua l i ty was greater and t h e i r product iv i ty was lower 
than quel i f ied piece ra t e Ss. 
Adams and Jacobsen (l964 ) gave t h e i r subjects to 
proofread, galleys and they were paid on the bas is of piece 
r a t e . IV : (1) male Ss paid 5012^/ page and e i the r to ld 
they were qus i i f ied or unqualified for task, o r to ld that 
they were unqualified and thus paid a t the reduced r a t e of 
20 0 /page; (2) Ss to ld work might be avai lable for several 
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months or that i t would n o t . D7 : ( i ) Productivi ty; (2) work 
qua l i t y . Their r e s u l t s show tha t unqualified Ss paid 3O ei' / 
page produced l e s s but higher qua l i ty work than qual i f ied 
Ss paid 30 iz^  / page and unqualified Ss paid 20 2^  / page 
reduced r a t e . The l a t t e r two groups didnot d i f fe r . 
Adams and Rosenbaum (i962) in another experiment 
used public interviewing as the task to be done by t h e i r 
sub jec t s . The I ? : (1) in 2 experiments Ss were to ld tha t 
they were qusillfied or unqualified for interviewing; (2) 
hourly or piece ra te pay. D7 : Product ivi ty . Results i nd i -
ca te tha t unqualified Ss produced more than qual i f ied Ss 
when paid hourly. Unqualified piece rate Ss produced l e s s 
than qual i f ied piece ra t e Ss. 
inderson and Shelly (i970) rep l ica ted Adams' 
experiment and gave t he i r subjects proof reading tafeks on 
hourly pay. Their IT : Ss told they were qual i f ied or under 
qual i f ied for task; (2) underqualified Ss were to ld e i t he r 
t ha t qua l i f ica t ion t e s t usual ly or always pred ic t s proof-
reading success. Hie DY : (1) Pjroductivity; (2) qua l i ty of 
work. The resu l t s showed no difference between the experi-
mental groups. 
Anderson and Shelly ( l97l} in another experiment 
fa i led to obtain empirical support for the hypothesis that 
inequi ty dissonance wi l l occur only among overrewarded Ss i f 
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they receive or expect to receive signs of fiisapproval from 
an authori ty figure or equitably rewarded group members. 
Andrews (l967} in an experiment used interviewing 
or data checking as the task to be done by the subjects for 
which they were paid according to piece r a t e . iThe IV : ( i ) 
In te res t ing (interviewing) or dull (data checking) task; 
(2) underpay (i5 ^), equitable (20 g() pay, or overpay (30 9^); 
(3) S's previous wage experience. The DY : (1) product ivi ty; 
(2) work q u a l i t y . The resu l t s obtained show tha t underpaid 
Ss produced more but at a lower qual i ty leve l than equitably 
paid Ss . Overpaid Ss produced l e s s but at higher qual i ty 
than equitably paid Ss. Ss ' previous wage experience was 
pos i t ive ly re la ted to product iv i ty and negatively to qual i ty 
within piece ra te groups. No effect of task i n t e r e s t was 
observed. 
Andrews and Yalenzi (i970) using ro le projection 
method made the Ss watch an induction procedure in which a 
30b applicant was unqualified for the pay he would rece ive . 
DV : Ss' responses to questions about how they would feel i f 
they were the appl icant . !Hie r e s u l t s show that 59 out of the 
80 Ss responded in teims of t h e i r s e l f image. No Ss responded 
in terms of inequi ty . Ratings of s t ructured a l te rna t ives 
indicated tha t Ss f e l t self-image responses were most 
p laus ib le aid wage inequity responses the l e a s t p l aus ib l e . 
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Arrowood ( l96i ) in h is unpublished doctoral 
d i s se r t a t ion gave publio interviewing as the task to h i s 
subjects who were paid for 3 hours before the task perfor-
mance. The IV" : (1) pay too high or about r igh t r e l a t i v e 
to qua l i f i ca t ions ; (2) S's work e i t h e r returned or not to 
payer. DV : product iv i ty . The r e su l t s from equity theory 
ind ica te tha t Ss who perceived pay too high r e l a t i v e to t h e i r 
qual i f ica t ions were more productive than those whose pay was 
about r i g h t . In t e rp re t t ing the r e su l t s on the basis of 
reinforcement theory show that Ss whose work was available 
to source of pay ±0 be more pixiductive than Ss whose work was 
not avai lable to source. 
Bass (l968) studied Graduate business students who 
were asked to recommend annual salary increases for 10 
hypothetical engineers with varying c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The 
r e su l t s show tha t Ss with lower in te l l igence and achievement 
who had strong social and re l ig ious values and who were 
geneious with company money for other purposes made higher-
sa lary recommendations . 
Benton ( l97 l ) following preliminary tasks made his 
subjects , boys in pa i rs and g i r l s i n pa i r s to bargain over 
divis ion of reward. IV : (1) S passed or fa i led reading 
t e s t ; (2) pairs were fr iends, non-friends, neutra; (3) sex 
of pa i r . DV : Allocation of reward. Results show tha t g i r l s 
prefer equali ty norm, but adopt equity norm i f equal divis ion 
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i s impossible. Boys prefer equity norm, but t h i s may be 
overridden by competitive achievement motivation. 
Berscheid, Boye, and WaLster (l968) in t h e i r expe-
riment made Ss allegedly pa r t i c ipa t e as " t r a i n e r s " , adminis-
t e r ing shocks, or "observers" in study of shock on verbal 
performance of confederate peer ("Yietim"). 17 : ( i ) Eaim-
doer (exp.gp.) or obsei^er (control gp . ) ; (2) expected or do 
not expect victim to be able to administer shock. DY : Ss ' 
derogation of vic t im. The study lead to the following 
r e s u l t s , the harm-doers derogate victims l e s s when they 
expect r e t a l i a t i o n that when they do not , but observers 
respond in reverse manner. 
Berscheid and WaLster (l967) led female Ss in the 
course of a game to deprive a fellow church member (victim) 
of green stamp books. In a second game they had a chance to 
compensate the vict im. The lY : (1) Insuff ic ient , adequate, 
or excessive compensation available to Ss; (2) chance to 
award compensation to victim (exp. gp.) or to cr ippled chi ld 
(control g p . ) . DY : Choice to compensate. The r e su l t s 
indicate that experimental Ss were more l i k e l y to compensate 
victim i f available compensation was adequate than i f the 
compensation was insuf f ic ien t or excessive. The same was 
not found among the control Ss. 
In another similar experiment Berscheid, Walster, 
and Barclay (l969) made the Ss play a question-answer game 
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in which they deprived the i r partner of green stamp books. 
In second game, they could give bonus to pa r tne r . The IT : 
( l ) S able to inadequately, adequately, o r overcompensate 
t h e i r partner (victim); (2) S required to choose to compen-
sa te immediately or after a delay. D7 : Whether or not 
Ss compensated vict ims. The r e su l t s of the study show that 
Ss in the immediate condition compensated the victim regard-
less of the adequacy of compensation. Ss in the delay 
condit ion were more l i ke ly to compensate in the adequate 
compensation condition than Ss in the inadequate and exce-
ss ive compensation condit ion. 
Blumstein and Weinstein (l969) made the Ss and 
confederate par tners wri te questionnaire i tems. The I ¥ : ( i ) 
Par tner did large or small proportion of work; (2) S's 
par tner claimed to have done 1/3 or 2/3 of the work; (3 ) 
Ss' score on Machiavellianism; (4) Ss' score on Need for 
Approval; (5) Ss' sex. DV : (l ) The amount of work claimed 
by S on a second set of items; (2) S's evaluation of par tner . 
The resu l t s show tha t the Ss who benefited from the pa r tne r ' s 
claim redressed the in jus t ice more than Ss who were victims . 
Females and Ss high on machiavellianism and Need for Approval 
did not redress in reward a l locat ion why they were vic t ims. 
Brickman and Bryan (l974) made 5th grade g i r l s view 
a movie of 7th grade g i r l who sur rep t i t ious ly modifies 
d i s t r ibu t ion of rewards in 4-person group. lY : (1) Girl in 
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the movie increases or decreases equal i ty among group members 
by her t r aas fe r s ; (2) g i r l in the moTie e i ther increases her 
own resources ( t he f t ) , decreases her own resources (Charity), 
or changes the rewards of 2 other group members in a d i s -
i n t e r est ed way. DV : (1) Ss' a t t i tude toward the 7th grade 
g i r l ; (2) Ss' ra t ings of fairness of f ina l d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Analysis of the r e s u l t s showed tha t char i ty t ransfers rated 
more favourably if they increased equa l i ty . This was not 
true of t h e f t s . Disinterested changes in rewards of two 
other members were rated more favourably in they increased 
equal i ty than i f they decreased equa l i ty . 
Burnstein and Wilosin (i968) made pa i r s of Ss work 
on a group reaction-time task in which each S i n i t i a l l y had 
equal respons ib i l i ty for jo in t outcome. IV : (1) Ss to ld 
performance re f lec ted important or unimportant s k i l l , or was 
chance; (2) One S ^Ofo successful, other 50^» 70^ or 30fo. 
DV : Ss' decisions on how much re spons ib i l i t y each member 
should have in determination of jo in t outcomes. Results 
show that Ss divided respons ib i l i ty for maximum jo in t out-
comes. Redistribution of r e spons ib i l i ty slower when perfor-
mance difference between Ss was smaller and task was important 
Callahan and Messe' (l973) used sane sex pa i rs of 
one S and one confederate who worked for 3 per iods , respect-
ively , as supervisor and worker in simulated i ndus t r i a l 
s i t u a t i o n in which workers addressed envelopes and supervisor 
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paid him according to his assessed perfoimance. IV : ( i ) sex 
of pa i r s ; (2) high or low fa te control of S; (3) Worker had 
counter power or no counter power in affecting S's pay; (4} 
worker perfoimance (low in 3 periods vs . low in f i r s t and 
medium in l a s t 2 ) ; (5) work period. BY : (1) S's pay a l l o -
cation to worker; (2) S's reasons for a l locat ion . Results 
point out tha t males (not females) paid workers most when 
they had high fate control and worker had counter power. Ss 
moved by equity considerations when woxker had no counter 
power mgjles were found to be more concerned with behaviour 
control and females .with equity. 
Clark (l958) in h i s unpublished doctorral d i s se r t a -
t ion studied supermarket checkout counters manned by "J-inger" 
(Cashier) and "bundler". Results show that inequi t i es 
r e su l t ing from bundler (low s t a tu s ) having higher inputs than 
ringer (higher s t a tus ) were inversely le la ted to labour 
eff ic iency. 
Cohen (1974 ) made pai rs of Ss j o i n t l y perform group 
react ion time task; success ra te for one S was BOfo, 50fo for 
other; Hie p a i r allegedly competing against other groups. 
IV : (1) success ra te wholly under voluntary cont ro l of Ss or 
p a r t i a l l y under uncontixDllable fac tors ; (2) high, medium, low 
c r i t e r i o n of group success to beat other groups. DV : D i s t r i -
bution of bonus reward. Analysis of the r e su l t s show t h a t 
ifflj^erior member (50^) in nonvoluntary condit ion were given 
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more of bonus reward than in volimtary condit ion. Also they 
were given more reward as the c r i t e r i o n of group success 
increased. 
Cook (i969) made the Ss perfoim proofreading task 
for which they were paid on hourly bas i s . IV : Ss underpaid, 
equitably paid, or overpaid in re la t ion to expected pay. 
DV : ( i ) Productivity; (2) work qual i ty ; (3) a t t r tudes toward 
t a s k . Results show tha t the perceived and actual performance 
was higher among overpaid Ss than other Ss. A time and 
payment in te rac t ion was found for a t t i tude toward the task . 
Underpaid Ss i n i t i a l l y l ik ing the task mater ia l more than 
d i s l ik ing i t , and f i na l l y l ik ing i t as much as equitably 
paid Ss . 
U^'^ai isereau, Gashman, and Graen (l9?3 ) conducted a 
longi tudinal cor re la t iona l study of 261 sa la r ied managers, 
and found out t ha t high performers who were not d i f f e ren t i a l ly 
compensated in comparison to low perfonners were much more 
l i k e l y than average to leave the orgatiieation. In cont ras t , 
when performance and compensation were contingently re la ted , 
manager were more l i ke ly than average to stay.-^ •^•^^_ ,^,.-^ 
Day ( l96l) in h is unpublished master ' s t hes i s made 
chi ldren push plunger for candies . The number of candies 
(between 1 to 6) were dependent on pressure exerted on plunger. 
After the responses had s t ab i l i zed , 25 candies were received 
by S on l a s t 5 t r i a l s . DV : Pressure exerted on overrewarded 
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t r i a l s . The r e s u l t s show that the Ss increased pressure when 
they were overrewarded. 
Day ( i96l ) created varying degrees of inequi ty in 
3-person work groups. Some equity theory predict ions f a i l ed 
but production help and pay rea l loca t ion within groups were 
found to be s ignif icant means of reducing inequity; the use 
of these means increased as inequity increased. 
Deci (i972) made Ss work on puzzles, a f te r which 
they were free to do several things, including work on the 
puzzle . The IV : ( i ) verbal or no verbal rein-forcement for 
puzzle solving task; (2) no payment for task v s . overpayment 
at the end of the task vs. oveirpayment a f te r the free-choice 
period following the task; (3) sex. DY : Time spent working 
on puzzles during free-choice per iod. The study led to show 
tha t Ss worked on puzzles more during free time when paid 
before free-choice period aid l ess when paid af te r the period 
than Ss who were not paid. 
Evan aad Simmons (l969) conducted 2 experiments, 
where S proofread galleys in a publ i sher ' s premises and were 
paid for the job on hourly b a s i s . I ? : Equitably paid, over-
paid, or underpaid in r e l a t ion to induced competence or to 
induced author i ty . DV : (1) Productivity, (2) Work qua l i ty . 
Results show that there was no d i f f e ren t i a l effects of pay-
authori ty discrepancies . Pay-competence discrepancies resul ted 
in underpaid Ss producing more but the work qual i ty was poor. 
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Evans and Molinari (l970) made t h e i r S do i n t e r -
viewing task for which they were paid on the basis of piece 
r a t e . The IV ; ( i ) High or low job securi ty; (2) Ss to ld 
they were qual i f ied or underqualified fo r pay r a t e . The 
DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work q u a l i t y . The analysis of 
r e s u l t showed t h a t there was a trend among unqualified 
(overpaid) Ss in both secure and insecure conditions to 
produce be t t e r qua l i ty work -fcan qual i f ied Ss. Security 
and qua l i f i ca t ion in teracted such tha t product iv i ty was 
grea ter among qual i f ied secure Ss than unqualified secure 
ones, whereas product ivi ty was greater among unqualified 
insecure Ss than qual i f ied insecure ones. 
Finn & lee (1972) made professional and s c i en t i f i c 
exployees in Federal Public Health Service answer questionn-
ai2?e measuring demographic and work his tory information; 
perception of job inputs , salary treatment, and job-re la ted 
a t t i t u d e s . Ss ' immediate superioi^ also completed the 
ques t ionnai re . The r e su l t s show tha t Ss in inequi tably 
t rea ted subsample displayed l e s s favourable joD-related 
a t t i tudes and h ad a h i ^ e r propensity to qui t t h e i r job than 
Ss in equitably t reated subs ample. Multiple regression model 
predicted equitable sa la r i e s (R = .933)-
Friedman «& Goodman (l967) gave t h e i r subjects 
interviewing task for which they were paid $ 3 .50 on hourly 
bas i s . The IV : ( l ) Ss to ld that they were qual i f ied or 
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underqualified; (2) Ss' perceptions of Ms qua l i f i ca t i ons . 
DV : Product ivi ty . The r e su l t s show tha t the qua l i f ica t ion 
induction did not affect product iv i ty . When Ss were c l a s s i -
f ied according to t h e i r perceived qua l i f i ca t ions , however, 
qual i f ied Ss produced more t h ^ i unqualified Ss. 
Garland (l972) in h is unpublished manuscript used 
proofreading material containing error as his task and paid 
h i s subjects on the basis of piece r a t e . The IV : (1) Ss 
h i red 'at 15 ^, 30 c^ , or 60 ^ page r a t e and to ld by a confede-
ra te worker that h i s pay was 3O ?( page; (2) sex. 331/" : (1) 
Productivi ty; (2) Work q u a l i t y . The r e su l t s indica te that 
underpaid males and females produced more work whereas when 
overpaid they produce l e s s work than equitably paid Ss. 
Overpaid males produced b e t t e r qual i ty woik but poorer 
qual i ty if underpaid. Underpaid females did poorer work 
than equitably paid females, but the ove3?paid female's work 
was not b e t t e r than the l a t t e r ' s . 
G-arrett (l973) presented a paper in which Ss were 
asked to a l locate I 15-40 among 4 hypothetical work group 
members varying systematically in e f for t and performance . 
IV" : (1) High or low S score on Mirels-Gariet t Protes tant 
Ethic Scale; (2) performance and effor t descript ion of 
member : Hi-hi, h i - l o , l o - h i , lo - lo . DV : Mount of money 
al located to each of 4 work group members. The r e s u l t s show 
tha t Ss with high Protestant Ethic scale scores used equity 
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as a basis of reward al locat ion more than low scorers . 
Garrett & libby (i973) made 9th graders perform 
proofreading task with hypothetical par tner who al located 
reward af ter t a s k . S was then allowed to a l locate bonus. 
I ? : ( l ) Ss to ld reward al locat ion by par tner was chance or 
i n t en t iona l ; (2) af ter performing equally with par tner , S 
was overrewarded or underrewarded. BY i (1) S's a l locat ion 
of bonus; (2) S's r a t ing of partner (good-bad, f a i r - u n f a i r ) . 
The study showed the Ss d is t r ibuted bonus to res tore equity 
when pa r tne r ' s i n i t i a l a l locat ion was i n t e n t i o n a l . Bonus 
allocated * o u t equally, ignoring the f i r s t reward a l locat ion, 
when pa r tne r ' s i n i t i a l a l locat ion was by chance. 
Gergen, Morse and Bode ( l97 l ) in t h e i r unpublished 
study made American and I t a l i a n Ss attempt to ident i fy words 
(English or I t a l i a n ) transmitted with noise over a speaker. 
IV : (1) Ss to ld tha t they would receive same pay as , 405^  or 
80^ more, or 40^ l e s s than they f e l t was correct for task. 
DV ; (1) Performance, (2) evaluation of task d i f f i cu l ty ; 
(3) perceived f a i r r a t e of pay for task . Results show that 
overpaid Ss' evaluation of task d i f f i cu l ty and f a i r r a t e of 
pay increased compared to equitably paid Ss. No systematic 
effects of pay on task performance was observed. 
Giles and Barret t ( l97 l ) made sixtyfour professional 
employees in e lec t ronics company respond to questionnaire on 
merit increases and s a t i s f ac t i on . The resu l t s show tha t 
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sa t i s fac t ion with pay increases was be t t e r predicted by the 
ra t io of merit increases to perceived equitable merit increase 
than by merit increase proper, percentage merit increase , and 
aalary plus i nc r ea se . 
Goodman & Priedman (l968) used questionnaire scoring 
as tile task for which the Ss were paid on the hourly bas i s . 
IV" : Six pay conditions : ( l ) Ss overpaid with emphasis on 
quantity of questionnaires scozed; (2) overpaid with qua l i ty 
emphasis; (3) oveipaid Ss with quanti ty emphasis to ld the 
pioduction r a t e of qual i f ied scorers ; (4) Ss paid at reduced 
ra te because of lack of qua l i f i ca t ions ; (5) Ss paid at reduced 
ra te because of lack of qua l i f ica t ions and told the production 
ra te of people with s imi la r qua l i f i ca t ions ; (6) Ss to ld they 
were qual i f ied and paid equi tably . DY ; (1) Productivity; 
(2) work q u a l i t y . Results of t h i s study show the ove3?paid 
Ss produced more than equitably paid Ss. Baphasis on quant i ty 
o r qual i ty effects Ss emphasis during performance, known 
production ra ted reduced the production variance of Ss. 
In another study Goodman and Friedman (l969) again 
used questionnaire scoring as the task for which the subjects 
were paid on piece ra t e b a s i s . IV : (1) Ss to ld they were 
qual i f ied or underqualified for task; (2) E's emphasis on 
qual i ty and quant i ty . D7 : ( l ) Productivi ty; (2) work 
q u a l i t y . The r e su l t s of th i s study show tha t underqualified 
Ss reduced inequity by increasing productivi ty or qua l i ty 
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depending on B's emphasis. Production differences between 
qua l i ty and q u m t i t y emphasis conditions was found to be 
greater for underqualified than for qual i f ied Ss . 
Greenberg & Leventhal(i973 ) presented a paper where 
Ss considered a business case in which two 2-man giToups 
\vorking on special projects were described. Ss were asked 
to recommend money bonus for eech woifcer. IV : ( i ) one worker 
in each group had above average performance, the other below 
average; (2} one group, i t was s ta ted , would def in i te ly f a i l 
i f i t continued to perform as i t had, while the other group 
would easi ly succeed; (3) half the Ss were ins t ruc ted to award 
bonus on basis of perfoimance, the others so as to motivate 
workers; (4) sex. DV : Bonus a l loca t ion . The r e su l t s show 
tha t Ss ins t rus ted to motivate workers gave greater bonuses 
to workers of f a i l i ng groups than did Ss ins t ruc ted to 
maintain equity. This resul ted also in higher bonuses for 
f a i l i n g than succeeding groups. Ss ins t ruc ted to reward 
for performance rewarded succeeding group more than f a i l i n g 
ones . Better performing members within groups were al located 
larger bonuses. 
Grreenberg, Block and Silveiman ( l97l) made the S 
and a confederate rale-play disabled workers perfoiming task 
in which S required help. In second task confederate was 
potenbial rec ip ient of help from S. IV : Confederate's help 
f r in f i r s t task resul ted in high extrareward for Sat low 
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cost to confederate, low ex t ra reward for S at moderate cost 
to confederate, or no extra reward for S at high cost to 
confederate. D? : Amount of help S gave confederate on 
second task . The r e s u l t s show tha t Ss were more l i k e l y to 
help i f confederate 's previous help had resul ted in h i ^ or 
moderate rewards for S than i f help resu l ted in low or no 
rewards. 
Greehber & Frisch (i972) used male Ss in the i r 
study who were required to complete a sa les forecast for 
which they needed help from a f i c t i t i o u s other; then Ss 
performed personnel task for which help was requested by 
o t h e r , j y : ( i ) Help given by other was del iberate or 
accidental ; (2) much or l i t t l e help given by o ther . DV : 
Help given by S on second task . The r e s u l t s show tha t more 
help was given in del iberate than accidental condi t ion , 
i l so more help was given in high help than low help condition, 
In another study Greenberg and Shapiro ( l97l ) used 
Ss with h i s arm in s l ing and confederate with an eye patch 
and sunglasses were geked to f i r s t assemble boxes, then to 
proof read copy for e r ro r s . IV" : (1) S ant ic ipated he would 
or would not be able to reciprocate help; (2) sex. D? : Ss 
wil l ingness to ask for help from confederate, fiesults shows, 
Ss unable to reciprocate help was l e s s l i ke ly to ask for i t 
from confederate than Ss who ant ic ipated tha t they could help 
confederate on second task. 
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Hoccoun, Wood, & Smith (l973) presented a paper in 
which they did a 3-stage experiment with piece rate pay. Ss 
woiicing with a confederate were f i r ^ t induced to believe t h e i r 
r a t e was same, greater , or lower than confedera te ' s . E then 
equalized the pay. Results show tha t underpaid Ss produced 
more . Productivi ty was greater when confederate 's pay r a t e 
was changed to equal Ss than when S's was changed to equal 
confedera te ' s . 
Heslin & Blake (l969) in another paper had Ss 
signed up for task for which they would he paid by the hour. 
IV : ( i ) In te res t ing (puzzle) v s . boring task (packing); (2) 
Under payment, usual payment, or overpayment; (3) high v s . 
low coianitment. DY : Productivi ty. Results show tha t commi-
t t e d Ss produced more than non-committed Ss. 
Hinton (l972) used groups of 9 Ss who checked and 
co l la ted IBM cards . IV : (1) Ss on hourly pay : underpaid, 
overpaid, o r equitably paid; (2) Ss on piece rate : underpaid, 
overpaid, or equitably paid; (3) Ss worked independantly, in 
task-dependent subgroups of 3 with each 3 subgroups paid 
d i f ferent ly , or in task dependent subgroups of 3 with each 
member receiving different pay but subgroups receiving same 
pay. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work qua l i ty . Results show 
that hourly paid Ss produced less but higher qual i ty work than 
piece ra te Ss . Avai labi l i ty of relevant referents and group 
se t t ings were important in determining performance. 
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Hinton & Barrow (l975 ) in t h e i r unpublished manu-
sc r ip t did a laboratory experiment of superior - subordinate 
rec iprocal reinforcement, the reluctance of a superior to use 
equal negative reinforcement when his own are negative suggests 
t ha t equity motivation may not operate in the negative range 
of outcomes. 
Homans (l953) in an observational study of female 
c l e r i c a l workers, found tha t , equal pay among c le iks of 
different s ta tus was perceived as inequitable and resul ted 
in d i ssa t i s fac t ion and efforts were made to bring pay i n l i n e 
with s t a t u s . 
Johnson (l973) used 6th graders who coded questionn-
aires in his study. IT : ( i ) Piece r a t e or hourly pay; (2) 
equity, mild inequi ty , or strong inequi ty . MV : S's socio-
economic s t a tu s , high or low. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work 
qua l i ty . Results supported the equity theory predic t ions 
among higher SES but not among lower SES Ss. 
Kahn (l972) used pai rs of Ss who f i r s t worked on 
proofreading as groups and "partner" d i s t r ibu ted reward; they 
then worked individual ly on second proof reading task and 
"subject" allocated rewards. IV : (1) Par tner ' s qua l i f i ca -
t ions , high or low; (2) sex; (3) S overpaid, equitably paid, 
o r underpaid af ter f i r s t task . D? : S's a l locat ion of rewards 
after second task . Results show that underpaid Ss took more 
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and overpaid Ss took less of the second reward than equitably 
paid Ss. Equity-restoring a l locat ions were only p a r t i a l ; a 
bias toward equal a l locat ion was observed. 
l a l t (l969) in his unpublished doctoral d i s se r t a t ion 
made his Ss do interviewing for 3 one-hour sessions at $ 2 /h r . 
IV : Ss were told that they had done well (equitably paid) or 
poorly (overpaid) on se lec t ion t e s t . DY : (1) Productivity, 
(2) qual i ty of work; (5) job r a t i n g s . Results show overpaid 
Ss produced more on f i r s t day than equitably paid Ss. Ss 
more productive on f i r s t session rated t h e i r qual i f ica t ions 
more favourably on the next two sessions than l e s s productive 
Ss. 
Kessler & Wiener (l972) made the i r sybjects do word 
manipulation for which they were paid on the hourly bas i s . 
I ? : (1) Ss t o ld they were qual i f ied or overqualified; (2) Ss 
believed they were working on ego-oriented task dependent on 
in te l l igence o r on simple c l e r i c a l task . DV : (1) Producti-
v i t y ; (2) Work q u a l i t y . The study showed that productivi ty 
was lower anong overqualified Ss than qual i f ied Ss . The work 
qua l i ty was found to be higher among overqualified Ss. 
Klein (l975) did a study to determine the r e l a t i ve 
predic t ive value of equity, expectancy, and reinforcement 
theor ies , questionnaires were given to blue c o l l a r workers 
to measure t h e i r pas t sa la ry reinforcement, expected future 
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sa la ry treatment, and perceived equity. Results show that 
equity and expectancy predicted job sa t i s f ac t ion , equity being 
the more powerful p red ic tor . 
Isne and Coon (l972) used preschool chi ldren as 
t h e i r subjects and made them do s t i cker pasting with f i c t i -
t ious partner; Ss then divided team reward &fter the t a sk , 
ly : ( i ) 4-to 5-year old Ss; (2) sex; (3) S-partner inputs : 
5-5, 5-l5» 15-5, 15-15 s t i c k e r s . DV : Reward alloc ation by 
S. Results show tha t 4-year-old Ss a l loca te rewards on basis 
of s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; 5-year-old Ss a l locate rewards on basis of 
equal i ty , non equity. 
lane, Coon, & Lichtman (l973) presented a paper in 
which they made children view video-taped TT program of 2 
adul ts playing a bal l game for which they would receive money 
in re la t ion to t h e i r performance. Awards were allocated to 
players by Ss. IV : (1) Ss in Kindergarten, 2nd, 4th, or 6th 
grade; (2) insuf f ic ien t , su f f i c ien t , or over su f f i c ien t rewards 
available for Ss' d i s t r ibu t ion to the winner and lose r of 
game; (3) S's sex. DV : Reward d i s t r ibu t ion . The study lead 
to the following conclusion, Ss al located a greater proportion 
of reward to the winner in the insuf f ic ien t and oversufficient 
conditions than in the suff icient condit ion. With insuff i -
Glent rewards, older Ss d i s t r ibu ted rewards more equitably than 
younger Ss. Generally, the norm of equity was the most 
important determiner of reward a l loca t ion . 
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Lane and Messe' ( l97l) conducted 2 experiments in 
which Ss completed various paper and penci l instniments, then 
d i s t r ibu ted rewards to selves and par tners when both had 
equal inputs ( f i r s t expt . ) and when t h e i r inputs varied 
systematical ly (second expt . ). D¥ : Reward d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Results of th i s study show that equi ty theory predict ions 
were generally upheld with respect to frequency of a l locat ion 
responses. Allocation in second experiment was p r inc ipa l ly 
influenced by inputs of pa r tne r . 
In another study l a i e and Messe' (l972) made S and 
confederate partner work on i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s quest ionnaire 
IV" : ( l ) S and partner worked for varying amounts of time; 
(2) different amounts of money for S to a l loca te to se l f and 
par tner . DV : S's a l loca t ions . Results show that Ss al located 
money equally when contributions were equal, but only i f t o t a l 
money available was consis tent with in te rna l standard of f a i r 
pay. If the t o t a l amount was more or l ess than t h i s , Ss 
al located proport ionately more to themselves. 
Lane, Messe', and Ph i l l ips ( l97l ) used answering 
questionnaires as the task for t h e i r sub jec t s . The IV : Ss 
in t r i ad s in which one S worked 3 hrs ., one S 2 hrs ., and one 
S 1 hr. on proportionate number of quest ionnaires . DV : (1) 
Esch S's al locat ion of I 12; (2) Which other S in the t r i a d 
would S vote for to al locate rewards. Results show tha t Ss 
al located rewards equitably in teims of hours worked. Ss voted 
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for other Ss in the t r i ad whose hour Inputs were the highest 
and most s imilar to the i r own to a l loca te rewards. 
lawler I I I (i965) had managers from government and 
pr iva te organizations respond to questionnaire about pay-
The r e su l t analysis showed that Ss reported that the d i f fe-
rence between t h e i r pay and pay of t h e i r superiors and 
subordinates was too small . Subjects ove3?estimated sub-
ord ina tes ' pay. 
In another study Lawler I I I (l968) made h i s subjects 
do public interviewing for which they were paid on the hourly 
b a s i s . IV" : Ss overpaid (low qual i f ica t ions for t a s k ) , over 
paid by ciicumstanae (qual i f ied) , or equitably paid (qual i f ied) 
D? : ( i ) Productivity; (2) work qua l i ty ; (3) S's desire to 
prove his competence. Results show overpaid Ss produced more 
but lower qual i ty work. Ss overpaid by circumstance did not 
d i f fer from equitably paid Ss. Overpaid Ss scored higher on 
desire to prove competerey than other Ss. 
Lawler I I I , Koplin, and Young (l968) used public 
interviewing for three 2-hour per iods , for which the Ss were 
paid on piece rate bas i s . IT : (1) Ss to ld they were qua l i -
f ied (equitably paid) , or underqualified (overpaid) for task; 
(2) Ss' need for money earned. DV : ( l ) Productivity; (2) 
work qual i ty ; (3) perceived q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The r e s u l t s show 
that overpaid Ss produced less but higher qual i ty work than 
equitably paid Ss in f i r s t period, but not next two. Instead, 
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t h e i r perceptions of t h e i r qual i f ica t ions increased. Ss' 
need for money corre la ted with product ivi ty soiong both over-
paid and equitably paid. 
Lawler I I I and O'Gara (l967) in t he i r study used 
interviewing for 2 hours tor which the subjects were paid on 
piece rate bas i s . I ? : Ss underpaid or equitably paid. DY : 
( l ) Productivity; (2) Work qual i ty ; (3) a t t i tudes toward job. 
Results show tha t underpaid Ss produced more interviews, but 
of lower qual i ty , and perceived job as more in t e r e s t i ng but 
l e s s complex, important, and challenging than equitably paid 
Ss. 
l e m e r (l965) made his female subjects l i s t e n to 
tape of 2 students working equally well at a j o in t anagram 
t a sk . One worker was more a t t r a c t i v e than o ther . IV" : The 
a t t r ac t i ve or l e s s a t t r ac t ive woricer paid I 3.50 for his work, 
the other paid nothing. D? : Ss' performance rat ings of 
workei^ . The study came to the conclusion tha t Ss rated 
rewarded worker as having contr ibuted more than the unrewarded 
woiker. The ra t ings of work group contr ibut ion were lower 
and Ss were more uncomfortable when the l e s s a t t r ac t i ve worker 
was rewarded. 
l e m e r (l974) in another study conducted three 
experiments in which kindergarten, 1st, and 5th grade Ss 
performed manual tasks with f i c t i t i o u s partner as a team or 
individual ly . Ss then assumed supervisor role and al located 
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re^wards to selves and par tners , or Ss simply deteimined own 
share . IV : ( i ) S produced more or less than partner; (2) 
tean v s . Individual i n s t r u c t i o n s . D? : Reward a l loca t ion . 
Result show that kindergartners based a l loca t ion on equali ty 
ra ther than equi ty . 
Leventhal (i972 a) presented a paper in which the 
S had to rajommend pay increases for 4 hypothet ical employees 
who had received outside job offer. I? : ( l ) High or low 
product ivi ty of employees; (2) high or average a t t rac t iveness 
of outside offer working conditions and benef i t s ; (5) i n s t r u c -
t ions to Ss to make counter offers to weed out worst and 
r e t a in a l l employees; or no ins t ruc t ions DV : Ss' recommenda-
t ion for pay increases to each employee. Results of t h i s 
study show tha t Ss offerred high productivi ty workers more 
than low productivi ty workers and more when outside offer was 
highly a t t r ac t i ve than when i t was average. Difference be t -
ween amount offered to high and low product ivi ty workers was 
greater for Ss tofld to weed out worst and r e t a i n best than 
for Ss to ld to r e t a in a l l . 
leventhal , J0.1en, and Kemelgor (l969) in a study 
made the S and partner (Confederate) ferform arithmetic task 
for group pay of I 1.40 allocated by par tner . S was then 
allowed to change a l loca t ion . IV : Amount a l located by 
par tner to S : $ 1.20, 95 4, 70 i, 45 4, 20 i, 5 s^ , or 2 i . 
DV : (1) S's changing al locat ion of reward; (2) S's tension 
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and ant ioipatory iDehaviour toward par tner . Results of the 
study show that Ss receiving too much (too l i t t l e ) r e l a t i v e 
to t h e i r work inputs decreased (increased) the i r own rewards. 
Ss receiving 70 gi did not change a l l oca t ion . Five Ss surfe2> 
ing extreme inequity (5 (^  and 2 ^ a l locat ion) decreased the i r 
rewards. Ss ' tension level increased as s ize of the inequity 
increased; Ss planned to compensate for inequity on future 
t r i a l s . 
Leventhal and ^de r son (1970) used preschool in 
t h e i r study who pasted s t a r s with f i c t i t i o u s pa r tne r . 11 ; 
( l ) Ss to ld the i r performance was superior, equal, or in fe r io r 
to par tners ; (2) Ss' sex. D¥ : ( l ) Reward a l locat ion; (2) Ss' 
reports of each member's performance. The analysis of r e s u l t 
showed tha t the boys took more reward when t h e i r performance 
was superior than when i t was equal to p a r t n e r ' s . Girls did 
not . Neither boys nor g i r l s in infer ior performance condi-
t ions took less than half of reward, but both minimized 
pa r tne r s ' performance. 
Leventhal and Bergman (l969) used S and confederate 
who worked equally on arithmetic t a s k . IV : ( l ) Confederate 
gave S 40 iz( o r 5 ^ of $ 1.4O reward after task; (2) Confederate 
sent S message with high or low s t a tus t h rea t . DV : S's 
rea l loca t ion , e i ther increasing or decreasing h i s reward upto 
5!^. The resu l t s show that Ss awarded somewhat l e s s than half 
of reward increased t h e i r share, whereas Ss a«;arded much less 
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decreased -ftieir share. Extreme unprofitable inequity 
increases self-depriving behaviour. 
Leventhal and lane (i970) made t h e i r subjects work 
with a f i c t i t i o u s partners on mul t ip l ica t ion problems for 
•which the paid received money. Ss allowed to divide earnings 
afterward. IV : ( i ) Ss t o ld the i r performance was in fe r ior 
or superior to p a r t n e r ' s ; (2) S's sex. DV : (1) Allocation 
of earnings; (2) perceptions of inputs . Results show tha t 
males al located rewards equitably on -ttie basis of performance. 
Females in superior performance condition took approximately 
half the reward; those with infer ior performance took much 
l e s s than ha l f . Superior performance females tended to 
b e l i t t l e t h e i r performance. 
Leventhal and Michaels (l969) had t h e i r Ss work 
with confederates on jigsaw puzzles and then a l located rewards 
earned. I? i Ss required : (1) to work for longer or shorter 
duration than confederate, and (2) to complete smaller or 
grea ter quant i ty of work. DV : (1) Reward a l loca t ion; (2) 
perceptions of i npu t s . Result show that with amount of work 
constant, Ss was who worked longer look less reward than Ss 
who worked for shorter duration. When amount of work and 
duration were proportional for each member, Ss divided reward 
equally. 
In another study Leventhal and Michaels ( l97l} had 
t h e i r subjects judge the extent to which 16 hypothetical 
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persons should be rewarded for performance in v e r t i c a l jumps. 
IV : Attr ibutes of hypothetical persons : ( l ) h i ^ or low jump 
performance; (2) high or low effort ; (3) t a l l and short body 
height; (4) useful and unuseful t r a i n i n g . DY : How deserving 
of reward persons were. Results of the study show that with 
performance held constant, persons whose height and t r a in ing 
helped them in jumping were rated as l e s s deserving than those 
whose h e i ^ t and t ra in ing did not help. Ss rated individuals 
with high effort as more deserving than those with low e f f o r t . 
leventhal , Michaels, and Sanford (1972) conducted 
two experiments where Ss allocated rewards to 4 hypothetical 
group members. IV : Group members varied as to ( l ) high or 
low performance and (2) high and low ef for t ; (3) Ss ins t ructed 
to a l loca te rewards in such away as to prevent conf l i c t among 
members, to prevent conf l ic t between Experimenters and members, 
to ignore pos s i b i l i t y of conf l i c t , or given ins t ruc t ions 
without reference to confl ict (4) group members would know 
(no secrecy) or not know (secrecy) rewards other received. 
DV : Amount of reward to members. Results show tha t Ss gave 
higher rewards to be t te r performers. They increased worst 
perfoimer 's share a t expense of best under ins t ruc t ions to 
prevent conf l i c t ; in f la t ion of worst perfoimer's rewards was 
smaller under secrecy than no secrecy condit ions. Ss' desire 
to conceal reward d i s t r ibu t ion was g rea tes t in ease of members 
given low reward. 
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In another two experiments conducted by leventhal , 
Popp, and Sawyer ( l973), chi ldren performed pegboard (or 
block) task and were rewarded. Ss were then asked to award 
p ic ture seals to 2 f i c t i t i o u s children who had perfoimed 
s imilar task, the r e su l t s of which were shown. I ? : ( i ) Small 
o r la rge performance difference between 2 chi ldera; (2) a l l o -
cate rewards as Ss thought best or as a teacher evaluating 
the r e s u l t s would think best ; (3) Ss' Sex. DY : Reward 
a l l o c a t i o n . The r e s u l t s indicate tha t Ss, specia l ly boys, 
gave g rea te r rewards to be t t e r performer when performance 
diffei^nce between chi ldern was l a rge . Boys gave grea ter 
rewards to b e t t e r performers when using own judgment than 
when expecting teacher to evaluate a l loca t ion . 
Leventhal, Weiss, and Buttrick (i973) in two expe-
riments designed i s so tha t the Ss could reward with r o l l s 
of film or paperbacks 2 f i c t i t i o u s telephone interviewers who 
were equally good r ^ p e n d e n t s . XV : (1) High or low previous 
purchase and use of film; (2) E s t ressed spoilage of unused 
film or omitted mention of t h i s ; (3) systematic var ia t ions in 
purchase and reading of books. DV : Reward a l loca t ion . 
Results show that interviewees more l i k e l y to be given film 
by S i f they had used film a t h i ^ ra te in past and i f S was 
in spoilage condition. S gave more books i f interviewees had 
high pas t ra te of usage, but only i f pest usage ra te of 
interviewees was great ly d i f fe ren t . 
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Leventhal, Weiss, and long (l969) made t h e i r S and 
a f i c t i t i o u s partner proofread mater ia ls ; partner then a l l o -
cated I 2 reward. S then had opportunity to real looate 
reward. IV : ( i ) Ss to ld that partner a l located reward 
in t en t iona l ly or hy chance; (2) S under rewarded (60 ^) or 
overrewarded (I I .40) . DV : ( l ) Ss modification of the reward 
a l loca t ion; (2) responses to quest ionnaire . Results indicate 
t h a t Ss overrewarded in ten t iona l ly decreased the i r share of 
reward as more than Ss overrewarded by chance. Ss under-
rewarded by chance increased the i r reward to same extent as 
Ss underrewarded in ten t iona l ly . 
Leventhal and Whiteside (i973) made t h e i r Ss award 
mid-term grade to 8 hypothetical students whose exam perfor-
mance was constant . I? : (1) High or low aptitude of students; 
(2) s tudents , forewarned or not, were expected to perform at 
t h e i r best ; (3) Ss ins t ructed to grade f a i r l y or to e l i c i t 
highest possible future performance. DY : Grade a l loca t ion . 
The r e su l t s showed tha t Ss gave higher grades to students 
with lower apt i tude . This was nore pronounced when Ss were 
t ry ing to motivate high future performance and when students 
had been warned to do the i r bes t . 
Leventhal, Younts, and Lund (1972) conducted two 
experiments in which household consumers were sold a cleaning 
product by E and then offered a r eba t e . IV : ( l ) Consumers 
to ld rebate was from salesman or from company; (2) consumers 
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to ld rebate was from salesman, from an individual supplier 
of the salesman, from a group of suppl iers , or from the 
com-panj. DV : Consumers' acceptance of r eba t e . The r e su l t 
showed tha t householders accepted rebate from company more 
than from others . 
Libby and G-arrett (l974) made 1st and 5th graders 
work on timed pioofreading, bel ieving that another ch i ld was 
doing same task in another room and that they would j o i n t l y 
receive 10 pennies for working. Partner divided 10 pennies, 
then S d is t r ibuted 10 bonus pennis. lY : ( i ) Ss underrewarded 
(3 e^ ) or overrewarded (7 ^); (2) Ss to ld that the p a r t n e r ' s 
a l loca t ion was in ten t iona l or chance; (5) school grade. DY : 
Ss al location of 10 bonus pennies; (2) fa i rness and goodness 
ra t ings of pa r tne r . Results showed that overrewarded Ss s p l i t 
bonus in half with par tners ; underrewarded Ss awarded only 
3 !^  to par tner . Neither i n t e n t i o n a l i t y nor grade had an 
effect on bonus divis ion. 
Lincoln and Levinger (l972) made Ss observe s l ides 
of white policeman and black c i v i l i a n . IV : (1) Policeman in 
s l i de s attacking c i v i l i a n (aggression) or not (nonaggression); 
(2) Ss' ra t ings to be used only by B (no consequence) or by 
inves t iga t ive i n t e r r a c i a l commission (consequence). DY : 
(1) Ratings of perceived in jus t i ce ; (2) r a t ing of policeman 
and black c i v i l i a n . Results show that i n no-consequence 
condit ion, c i v i l i a n rated lower under aggression than 
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nonaggression . Reverse r e su l t s were obtained in consequence 
condi t ion. In consequence condition, ra t ings of c i v i l i a n 
pos i t ive ly corre la ted with perceived in jus t ice . 
Long and lerner (l974) in t h e i r study had 4th grade 
Ss engaged to "market t e s t " a gmie for which they were paid 
70 d^. They were then given opportunity to donate some of the 
pay to a child char i ty . IV : ( l ) Donation to char i ty would be 
known to no one, to E and teacher, or to future younger Ss; 
(2) overpaid or properly paid; (5) Ss' scores on delay of 
g r a t i f i c a t i on t e s t . DV : Donation to char i ty . Results 
showed that overpaid Ss donated more than properly paid Ss. 
Ss with high tolerance for delayed g ra t i f i ca t ion gave more 
when overpaid and less when properly paid. No effect of who 
would know of donation. 
In a study done by Harwell, Ratchiff, and Schmitt 
(l9^2) the aathors made p a i r s of Ss play a 2-peison game in 
2-stage e3cperiment. I ? : (1) Games played in f i r s t stage 
produced inequi ty or equity between Ss; (2) sex of Ss. D? : 
Ss' noneooperation in the second stage of maximizing Diffe-
rence Game. The resu l t s show that Ss behind the i r partners 
in f i r s t stage made more noncooperative responses than t h e i r 
"ahead" par tners , thus minimizing the difference between 
players and increasing equi ty . This effect was stronger 
among females . 
Masters (l969) used 4-to-5 year old Ss for the study 
54 
in which the Ss played a question game with younger par tner 
for which they received reward-tokens. Then Ss replayed 
question game with E and divided rewards. I ? : ( i ) Ss r ece i -
ved fewer, the same number, or more reward tokens than pairfcner; 
(s) Ss sex. D7 : Number of reward tokens Ss gave to them-
selves when repleying game with E. The re su l t showed Ss 
receiving fewer and g i r l s receiving more tokens than partners 
took more tokens in the second game . 
McArthur, Kiesler , and Cook (l969) made t h e i r sub-
jec t s complete 2 "bogus" tasks after which the Ss received 
feedback and were promised pay for a future one-hour t e s t . 
IV : ( i ) low ($ 1.50) or high ($ 10) promised payment; (2) 
feedback to Ss : Had "doer" personal i ty e n t i t l i n g them to 
payment, had "doer" personal i ty , but e n t i t l e d to payment 
because of tasK performance; or e n t i t l e d to pa.yment because 
of performance. D? : Ss' response to request by a second 
experimenter to pass out ant ipol lu t ion l e a f l e t s . Result 
showed that high payment Ss were more wi l l ing to pass out 
l e a f l e t s than low payment Ss. Ss to ld that they were paid 
for having "doer" personal i ty were more wi l l ing to pass out 
l e a f l e t s than Ss in other feedback condi t ions . 
In a study conducted by Messe' i l97 l ) the inves t i -
gator made the Ss f i r s t perform questionnaire task for varying 
lengths of time; they were then paired to bargain using Morgan-
Sawyer bargaining board with 9 possible outcomes. Ss ppendlng 
more time in pretask assigned high payoff side of board. 
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IV : imount of time spent on questionnaire task, 0, 40, 50, 
60, or 80 minutes. DV : Agreed-upon outcomes in bargaining. 
!rhe resul t indicate that equity mediated the bargaining 
c o n f l i c t . Ss agreed upon outcomes on the basis of amount of 
time spent on p ret ask. 
In another study Messe', Dawson, and Lane (l973) 
used PD game bargaining as the task to be done by t h e i r 
subjects . IV : ( l ) Ss e i the r worked for i i hours on pre-
bargaining task or did not; (2) low or high-reward PD matrix; 
(3) Ss to ld or not told how many PD t r i a l s they would play. 
DV : Amount of cooperation in PD gme. The r e su l t s show tha t 
Ss who worked on pretask made more cooperative responses in 
high-reward PD game than in low-reward game, resu l t ing in 
more equitable payment. Ss who did not work on pretask made 
more cooperative responses in low-reward than high-rewara game. 
In a paper presented by Messe' and Lichtman (l972) 
the subjects had to do mult ipl icat ion problems with a f i c t i -
t ious co-worker. IV : (1) Sex; (2) qua l i ty of S's performance, 
superior or in fe r io r to co-worker; ( 3 ) 8 worked longer or 
shor ter time than co-worker; (4) S recrui ted by promise of 
money or research c r e d i t . DV : S's reward a l locat ion to 
himself and co-worker. Results show tha t the promise of 
research c r ed i t led to work qual i ty as basis for HS. rewarded 
al locat ion more than promise of money, females a l located 
more to partners than to themselves. 
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MDore and Baron (l973) had t h e i r Ss proofread 
galleys for which they were paid on the basis of p iece ra te . 
IV : ( i ) "Standard", greater , or lesserpay; (2) Ss to ld they 
were qual i f ied or unqualified for task. DV : (1) I toduc t iv i ty ; 
(2) Work qual i ty ; (3) S's work a t t i t udes . Hie resu l t s of the 
study show tha t the unqualified Ss produced higher qua l i ty 
but lower quanti ty than qual i f ied Ss. Overpaid qual i f ied Ss 
did poorer qual i ty work than standard pay qual i f ied Ss. No 
main effects of pay on product ivi ty was observed. Unqualified 
Ss were found to be more d i s sa t i s f i ed than qual i f ied Ss. 
Overcompensated Ss perceived the work as more important than 
undercompensated Ss. 
MDrgan and Sawyer (i967) using a game board, made 
5th and 6th grade boys bargain for monetary rewards with 
par tner . Possible rewards for each differed. lY : (1) Ss 
did or didnot have information about p a r t n e r ' s expectations; 
(2) partners were friends or non-friends. DV : (1) Duration 
of bargaining; (2) outcomes. Results show that Ss preferred 
equal i ty of outcomes. Knowledge of pa r tne r ' s expectations 
f a c i l i t a t e d bargaining. 
Marris and Eosen (l973) made t h e i r Ss assume the 
r o l e of a disabled person (arm in s l ing) and then perform 
manual task, and then told they could not meet quota. Later 
to ld e l e c t r i c i t y would be cut off, affecting help they could 
give to v isua l ly handicapped co-worker. IV : (1) Ss told they 
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performed well or poorly for manually handle ^ p e d person; 
(2) told i t would be possible or impossible to help v isua l ly 
handicapped co-worker. DV : Ss help seeking from co-worker 
on f i r s t task. The conclusion reached was the Ss told they 
had perfomed poorly were l e s s l i ke ly to seek help . Effects 
of opportunity to help co-worker l a t e r were mixed. 
Fystrom (i973) used a computer simulation approach 
based on career sa la r ies of 1OO persons- The computer model 
finds support for Jaques' theory of equitable payment. 
Pepitone ( l97 l ) conducted two experiments using 
pa i r s of Ss who played the PD game. I ? : One of the 2 Ss 
were given $ 2 bonus on the basis of merit t e s t , given bonus 
a r b i t r a r i l y , or given w bonus. DV : Ss ' choices in PD Game. 
fhe resu l t s show that Ss made maximizing choices with a 
frequency such tha t equity was obtained. 
Planz (l970) in h is unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a -
t ion studied male teachers from selected schools who had in 
o r le f t 2 school d i s t r i c t s with differing reward s t r u c t u r e s . 
Results shows that stayers perceived a higher degree of 
equity than l eavers . -Above average performance was cor re la ted 
with perceived equity. 
Pri tchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson (i972) used 
males Ss who worked on c l e r i c a l task in simulated company 
for 7 half-days. IV : (1) Ifourly or modified piece rate pay, 
pay mode reversed af ter 3 sess ions; (3) equitable, over, or 
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underpayment. DV : Cl) Performance; (2) job s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
Results showed that overpayment and underpayment r esu l t ed in 
higher and lower performance, respect ively . Over- and under-
paid Ss were more d i s sa t i s f i ed than equitably paid Ss. 
Radinsky (l969) made S and alleged other play a 
gme with 2 possible responses, one of which resu l ted in 
"equitable" outcomes and other in unfavourable inequity 
outcomes. I? : ( l ) S given knowledge of own and o t h e r ' s 
outcomes or only of own outcomes; (2) S's sex. D? : Number 
of times each of 2 possible choices made. Results show tha t 
Ss responses i n comparison and noneomparisen conditions 
suggests t ha t equity and inequity have reward and punishment 
e f fec t s , respect ive^. Female Ss more seiteit ive to equity-
inequity than males . 
Rosen and Jerdee (l974) made t h e i r Ss read one of 
8 versions of a case describing a salesman who "padded" his 
expense account. Ss then recommended the most appropriate 
d i sc ip l ina ry action. I ? : Padding was I 10~15 or $ 8O-1OO 
mondly; (2) company paid among the h i ^ e s t or lowest commi-
ssions in the industry; (3) salesman's perfonnance was 1C^ 
above or 10^ below previous y e a r ' s . DY : (1) Severity of 
recommended d i sc ip l ine ; (2) perceived seriousness and uneth i -
c a l i t y of "padding"; (3) perceived respons ib i l i ty for offense. 
Results show tha t fiiscipline was l e s s severe fo r salesman in 
low paying company than in high paying one . Perceived 
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seriousness and unetMcal i ty of offence and the salesman's 
r e spons ib i l i ty for i t v/ere lower in the low paying company. 
Eothhart (i968) conducted 2 experiments in which 
the Ss acted as "supervisors" for a f i c t i t i o u s woiker and 
they were to increase the l a t t e r ' s performance on l e t t e r -
cancel l ing task by using th rea t of monetary punishment or 
promise of reward. E controlled infoimation about worker 
performance . IV" : ( i j High (I 4) or low (nothing s ta ted) 
motivation of supervisor; (2) Ss believed woiker would receive 
only monetary rewards given Dy supervisor or I 2.50, regard-
l e s s . DV : use of reward and punishment by S. Results show 
tha t Ss in high motivation condition used punishment more 
when they believed woiker would receive I 2-50, when the 
earnings discrepancy between the two was l e a s t . 
Schmitt and Maiweil (l972} conducted three experi-
ments, in which paiiB of Ss worked on cooperative or ind iv i -
dual t asks ; rewards for cooperation greater than for i nd iv i -
dual work, but favourably inequi tab le . Withdrawal from 
cooperative to lower-paying individual task was the only 
a l te rna t ive t o cooperation. I ? : (1) Large, moderate, or 
small inequity, (2) in moderate equity condit ion, Ss could 
e i ther give money to or take money from each o ther . DT : 
(1) Amount of time spent cooperating; (2) t ransfer of money. 
Results indicate tha t withdrawal from cooperation was an 
increasing function of inequity- When allowed to t r ans fe r 
60 
rewards, most subjects t ransferred enough to produce equity 
or near equi ty . 
Shapiro (i972) in his unpuDlished doctoral d i s se r -
t a t i on manipulated his Ss ' inputs and socia l d is tance . Ss 
were then allowed to al locate rewards to themselves and a 
p a r t n e r . I t was seen tha t high input Ss al located themselves 
more than half the reward, low input Ss l ess than ha l f . High 
input Ss allocated more to themselves when soc ia l distance 
was high. 
Simmons and Eemer (1968) conducted 2 experiments, 
i n which they used fsnale Ss supervisors whose pay depended 
on a f i c t i t i o u s partner who made checkerboards. In a second 
tasK, Ss were workers making envelopes. IV : UJ Ss had been 
rewarded o r "betrayed" by the pa r tne r ' s high or low production 
of checkerboards or had worked independently ^.control); (2) 
Ss believed t h e i r supervisor in second task had been rewarded 
or betrayed on f i i s t task. DV : Sivelopes made. Results show 
tha t previously rewarded Ss produced more for betrayed super-
visors and leas t for rewarded supervisors . 
Stephenson & ^ i t e (i968) had as t h e i r Ss, English 
boys who played model racing car games, some racing, and some 
r e t r i ev ing c a r s . They were then given opportunity to win 
pr izes by cheating on a oar racing quiz . lY : Ss raced cars 
hole time ("privi leged"); rased and re t r ieved half the time 
("equity^'); re t r ieved only for adult racers ("re la t ive 
w 
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deprivat ion") ; or re t r ieved only for other boys ("absolutely 
deprived"). DY : Cheating on quiz. Results show tha t cheat-
ing was greeted among absolutely deprived and greater among 
the r e l a t i ve ly deprived than among the equitably t r ea ted . 
Privi leged Ss did not cheat less than equitably t r e a t e d . 
Taynor and Deaux (l973 ) had t h e i r male and female 
Ss read descriptions of male or female stimulus person behav-
ing appropriately in civic emergency s i tua t ion previously 
shown to be more masculine than feminine. Ss then ra ted 
stimulus persons. IV : ( l ) S*s sex; (2) sex of stimulus 
person; (3) presence or absence in emergency s i tua t ions of 
non-acting person whose sex was opposite to stimulus pe r son ' s . 
DY : (1) How deserving of reward stimulus a person i s ; (2) 
ra t ings of stimulus person. Results show that female stimulus 
persons were perceived as deserving more reward than males in 
the same s i tua t ion , and t h e i r ra t ings were correspondingly 
i n f l a t e d . 
Telly, Erench, and Scott ( l97 l ) made hourly employees 
in a high and low turnover shops in a large company respond 
to questionnaire about inequity per ta ining to pay, supervision, 
leadmen, secur i ty , advancement, working condi t ions, and i n t r i n -
s ic and soc ia l aspects of the j ob . Inequity corre la ted with 
turnover. 
Tarnow ( l97l) proposes tha t ambiguous job elements 
may be perceived by Ss as ei-fcer inputs or outcomes. Based 
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on responses to a i20-iteni quest ionnaire, Ss who had previ -
ously par t ic ipa ted in an equity experiment (vide supra 
Pri tehard, Dunnette and Jorgenson, 1972) were c l a s s i f i ed as 
Type I (job elements perceived as inputs) and Type 0 (elements 
viewed as outcomes). The general findings are that peixjep-
t ions of job elements improves the p red ic t ab i l i t y of Ss' 
responses to overhand underreward. Underrewarded Type I Ss 
feel more underrewarded than underrewarded. Type 0 Ss and 
overrewarded Type I Ss feel less overrewarded than overrewarded 
Type 0 Ss. 
Valenzi and Andrews ( l97l ) hired t h e i r Ss on hourly 
pay ra te for c l e r i ca l work. IV : i f t e r working one session, 
Ss' pay was decreased (underpay), i n c r e ^ e d (overpay), or l e f t 
the same (con t ro l ) . DV:(i) Productivity; (2) work qua l i t y . 
Results stiow no s igni f icant differences between the 3 pay 
conditions . 21'fo of underpaid Ss qui t ; no Ss qui t in other 
pay conditions . 
Wahba (l972) using a 5-person coa l i t ion formation 
task, prefereixses for 3 forms of equity were t e s t ed : (1) 
equal i ty of outcomes, regardless of inputs; (2) propor t iona l i ty 
of outcomes according to re la t ive inputs ; (3) equal i ty of gains 
a f t e r repayment of inputs . Females preferred the f i r s t , males 
the t h i rd form. 
Walster and Austin (l974) had t h e i r Ss, expecting 
normal I 2 pay, proofread pages, believing a second person 
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did s imilar task and that a supervisor would evaluate work 
and d i s t r i b u t e $ 4 between the 2 pioofseaders . IT : (1) 
Having learned partner and he had performed equally well, S 
were led to expect equitable or inequitable payment; (2) S 
equitably, over- or underpaid. JDV : Ss* contentment and 
d i s t r e s s as measured by Mood Adjective Check l i s t before and 
a f t e r . Results show that equitably paid Ss were more content 
than underrewarded. Ss expecting inequity were l e s s d i s t ressed 
with inequity than Ss expecting equity. 
Weick (l964 ) lured the Ss and made them work for 
the experimenter for no c red i t evaluated t h e i r task mo2?e 
highly than Ss who worked for normal course c r e d i t , thus 
increasing t h e i r net t o t a l outcomes. 
Wicker and Bushweiler (i970) had t h e i r Ss ra te 18 
2-person work s i tua t ions . TV : (1) person l iked or dis l iked 
a co-worker; (2) was more, l e s s or equally valuable to employer 
as co-worker; (5) earned more, l e s s , or the same as co-work a?. 
DV : Ss' ra t ings of fairness and pleasantness of the s i t u a t i o n . 
Results show that fa i rness re la ted to the inputs and outcomes 
of workers. Pleasantness ra t ings re la ted to l i k ing of co-
worker. 
In another experiment they made female Ss and 
comfederate work on oral-analogies t e s t . I ? : (1) Ss received 
more or less money than confederate; (2) Ss to ld they had made 
more or fewer correc t responses than co-worker; (3) co-worker 
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made remaifcs to cause S to e i the r l i ke or d i s l ike her . D? : 
Ss' ra t ings of the fairness and pleasantness of the s i tua t ion . 
Results were same as above. 
Wilke and Lanzetta (l970) had the i r Ss a l loca te 
trucks and ra i l road cars for shipping goods for 40 t r i a l s . 
Ss worked in pa i r s and believed they could help each other , 
j y : S was helped 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 times during the f i r s t 
20 t r i a l s , 10 of which could be completed without he lp . 
DV : S's responses to pa r tne r ' s 10 requests fo r help in 
second block of 20 t r i a l s . Results show that help-giving 
was proportional to pr ior help received. 
Wilke and Steur (i972) had Dutch Ss decode persona-
l i t y questionnaires fo r which they were paid on hourly bas i s . 
IV : (1) Ss to ld they had low, medium or h i ^ qua l i f i ca t ions ; 
(2) overpaid or equitably paid. D? : (1) Productivity; (2) 
work qua l i ty . Results show tha t overpaid and equitably paid 
Ss did not d i f fer in product ivi ty and work qua l i ty . Low 
qual i f ied Ss produced more . 
Wood and Lawler (i970) made t h e i r Ss read a r t i c l e s 
aloud for which they were paid on piecerate ba s i s . IV : Ss 
to ld they were qual i f ied or underqualified for t a sk . DV : 
(1) imount of time S read aloud; (2) qual i ty as determined 
by Ss ' Choice of d i f f i cu l t and easy a r t i c l e s to read. Results 
show that overpaid Ss produced l e s s than equitably paid Ss. 
lower product ivi ty could not be a t t r ibu ted to s t r i v ing for 
higher qua l i t y . 
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¥yer and Malinowskl (l972) had pai rs of Ss f i r s t 
p a r t i c i p a t e in achievement task, then receive feed hack on 
t h e i r performance, then in te rac t in a ser ies of 2-person game 
s i t u a t i o n s . IV" : ( i ) same or d i f ferent sex pa i r s ; (2) nega-
t ive or pos i t ive feed back on achievement task performance. 
DV : (1) S's response choices in 2-person games; (2) S's 
perception of par tner as fr iendly and competitive. Results 
show that for pa i r s of same sex, Ss' response choices reduced 
inequi t ies in outcomes . 
uchtman (i972 ) used questionnaires to measure 
reward d i s t r ibu t ion and work-role a t t rac t iveness of managers 
and workers in 26 Kibbutzim. Results show that managers 
received more i n t r i n s i c job sa t i s fac t ion and power-related 
rewards but were less a t t rac ted to t h e i r jobs than workers . 
The findings are explained by equity theory. I " ^ ^ 
Zedeck and Smith (i968) used an adaptation of the 
Method of l imi t s protocols which were administered to jun ior 
executives and secre ta r ies in a large midwest em academic 
i n s t i t u t i o n to determine perceived equitable payment and 
j u s t meaningful difference of payment. Results of th i s study 
show that perceived equitable payment and jus t meaningful 
differences were greater for executives than s e c r e t a r i e s . 
GHiPTER I I I 
METHOD MD PROCEDURE 
The purpose of th is study i s to ascer tain whether, 
socio-economic l eve l , emotional adjustment and anxiety 
var iables influence the feeling of inequity. Inequity has 
been taken as the dependent variable while socio-economic 
l eve l , emotional adjustment and anxiety, the independent 
variables . This leads to the measurement of subjects socio-
economic l eve l , the level of t h e i r emotional adjustment and 
the level of t he i r anxiety. 
Ttie socio-economic level or s ta tus of the subject 
was measured by a scale developed by Ja lo ta , Pandey, Kapoor 
and Singh (l970} known as the Socio-Economic s ta tus Scale 
Questionnaire (SISSQ-Urban) (Appendix I ) . The questionnaire 
of t h i s scale seeks infoimation about the following compo-
nents : 
1. Parental occupation. 
2 . Parental education and education of s i s t e r s and 
brothers . 
5 . Ebonomic I n d e x - income, "touse type, mater ia l 
possession. 
4 . Cultural level of the family as judged by 
expenditure on newspaper, magazine and mater ia l 
possessions. 
5. Psychological indicators - as l eve l of aspira-
t ion, concept of soc ia l pres t ige and be l ie fs in 
caste determining the tendency towards concer-
vatism or progressivism. 
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Co-efficient of s t a b i l i t y of th i s scale was ca lcu-
la ted by t e s t - r e t e s t method. The corre la t ion of the scores 
of 50 subjects taken at t-wo different times m t h an Interval 
of one month was found to be "89. 
lEhe concurrent va l i d i t y of th i s scale was also 
established by t e s t i ng iden t i f i ab le groups. When the scale 
was administered to students studying in La Martiniere 
College, lucknow, where generally children from upper middle 
c lass go to study, i t was noted tha t t he i r mean score was far 
beyond the mean score for the whole sample, 66.31 for l a 
Martiniere as against 36.86 of the original sample. 
fhe norms have been provided by this scale , For 
the purpose of th i s study only the subjects f a l l i ng in the 
lower s t r a t a (raw score-11-SQid below) and subjects f a l l i ng 
in the upper s t ra ta (raw score-63-sind above) were taken. 
The emotional adjustment of the subjects was 
measured by the Aligarh idjustment Inventory developed by 
A. Jamil Qadri (1964) and Guidance Unit of Department of 
Psychology, A.M.U. (Appendix I I ) . !Hie l eve l of the inventoiry 
i s fo r college and univers i ty s tudents . I t s main features 
deal with the following areas : soc ia l , emotional, heal th , 
family and f i n a n c i a l . The t o t a l number of i tens in the 
inventory are 90. The r e l i a b i l i t y when calculated through 
the spl i t -haLf method was »77 for soc ia l ; '87 for emotional; 
'85 for hea l th ; '89 for family; and'87 for f inanc ia l . With the 
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ratings based on clinical interviews the validity of this 
inventory was found to he '73 . Norms have been provided for 
female as well as male students. lor the purpose of this 
study only those subjects were taken who fell in the category 
of highly adjusted (raw score-0-20) and highly maladjusted 
(raw score-45-90). 
The anxiety level of the subjects was measured by 
Sinha ¥. A. self-analysis Form (Anxiety Scale) developed by 
D.Sinha (l968) (Appendix I I I ) . As is obvious from the table 
given below, the test has high reliabil i ty. Standard error 
of measurement was found to be 6.10, indicating that the true 
score did not deviate too greatly from their true value. 
METHDD F r Index of Reliability S.E.M. 
Split-half 239 86 0'92 6.10 
Test-ret est 88 73 0'83 
The score on Taylor's MAS, as modified by the author 
was used ^ the first validation criterion. On 70 subjects 
who had taken the test, Tgylor's MAS was administered. The 
correlation was found to be .69, which was of the same order 
as obtained on the unrevised version of the scale, and indi-
cated that the two tests were measuring almost the same thing. 
The norms for this test have been provided for female as well 
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as male s t u d e n t s . For the purpose of t h i s s tudy , sub j ec t s 
having (72, 63 , 57, 48 scores - very high l e v e l of anx ie ty ) 
and s u b j e c t s having (18, 11, 1 sco res - very low l e v e l of 
anx ie ty) were s e l e c t e d fo r t h e f i n a l exper iment . 
The f i n a l sample of t h i s s tudy c o n s i s t s of 80 
undergraduate female s t u d e n t s of Women's College, :filigarh 
Muslim Univers i ty , i l i g a r h . The socio-economic s t a t u s s c a l e , 
the l l i g a r h Adjustment Inventory, and the Sinha ¥-A s e l f -
Analysis Form (Anxiety s c a l e ) were j o i n t l y adminis tered to 
each of 43O female undergraduates of B.A., B.Sc ., 1 s t , IXIrd 
and Vth semes te r s . The fol lowing breakup shows the number 
of s t u d e n t s in each c l a s s and the f i n a l number chosen to 
p a r t i c i p a t e in the i n e q u i t y experiment. 
CLASSES 
B.A. 
B.A. 
B.A. 
B.Sc. 
B.Sc. 
B.Sc. 
TOTAL 
SEMESTEE 
I 
I I I 
V 
I 
I I I 
V 
STUDENTS 
85 
74 
68 
89 
59 
55 
430 
NUmSft of STUBMSS 
GEOSm FOR TEE 
EXPERIMENT 
15 
13 
16 
15 
11 
10 
80 
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Ea3h of the 80 subjects, i n herself , combined the 
three cha rac t e r i s t i c s of SEL, EA and ix in Tarious ways e .g. 
LSEL - LEA - LA (iO subjec ts ) ; LSEL-LEA-HA (10 subjec ts ) ; 
LSEL-HEA-LA (lO subjects) ; LSEL-HEA-HA (iO subjec ts ) ; HSEL-
LEA-LA d o subjec ts ) ; HSEL-LEA-HA (10 subjec ts ) ; HSEL-HEA-LA 
ClO subjects) ; HSEL-HSA-HA (lO sub jec t s ) . 
The Aligarh Mislim University, Aligarh, as a Central 
I n s t i t u t i on of learning a t t r ac t s students from the whole 
country and may therefore, could be assumed to be a represen-
t a t i ve i n s t i t u t i o n . The average age of the subjects was 
found to be 18 .5 yrs . 
To form the t r i a d s , the 80 subjects were randomly 
chosen and assigned a time to appear together for the exper i -
ment . 
The subjects were tes ted by the experimenter and 
to ld that the experiment simulated conditions found in industry 
and business where people worked together . 
They were read out the following ins t ruc t ions : 
"You three w i l l work together on the same task, making a 
group. lour group wil l receive a monetary reward for the 
work. One of you would then be selected by l o t to divide 
the reward or group earnings." 
After receiving the preliminary ins t ruc t ions , they 
were asked to s i t on the s tools with the group react ion time 
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apparatus in front and given the following infoimation : 
is 
"ThiS;^a group react ion time apparatus which has 
measuring devices where I am s i t t i n g and individual panel at 
which you now s i t . Each panel contains a stimulus l i g h t , 
and a reaction icey, and they are so l abe l l ed . In each of 
the t r i s l s , the stimulus wi l l cons i s t of the onset of a white 
stimulus l i g h t on your panel . You are required to press your 
reaction key as quickly as you can after th i s l i g h t eppears . 
Your reaction wi l l be considered a success i f and only i f i t 
occurs within a very short time in te rva l after the onset of 
the white l i g h t . If you don't react withiufche i n t e rva l , yaur 
react ion wi l l be considered a fa i lu re and t h i s wi l l be ind i -
cated by the l i gh t i ng of the red fa i lu re l i g h t on your panel. 
Each of you wil l be able to see your own and your partners 
f a i l u re l i g h t s . " 
The above description of the group react ion time 
apparatus was correct except that the appearance of the 
fa i lu re l i g h t s was cont iol led, independently of the subjects 
actual reac t ions , by the experimenter according to a fixed 
schedule. This schedule required that in the course of the 
.experiment, one subject received 80^o successful feedback, 
the second 5C^ successful feedback, and the t h i r d subject 
i^  received 30^ successful ]f)eedback, i r r e spec t ive of t h e i r actual 
success or f a i l u r e . The s i tua t ion was, actual ly, manipulated 
by the experimenter in accordance with the preplanned obje-
c t ive of the experiment. After the termination of the 
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experiment the subjects were asked to record t h e i r names and 
percentage of correc t responses of t h e i r partners and them-
selves on the sheet provided. 
The subjects were again told that the three of them 
are pa r tne rs , have worked on the same task and tha t t h e i r 
group wi l l receive a monetary reward for i t s work, which one 
of them, by chance, wi l l be chosen to divide between them-
se lves . 
Each subject was now dealt with separa te ly . When 
they reported to the experimenter they were given the sheet 
on which they had recorded the percentage of correc t response 
of t h e i r partners and themselves . 
Then the experimenter to ld the subject t h a t , as a 
group the three of them have earned Ife . 6 / - and tha t they can 
see each others contributions on the sheet given to them. 
The subject was then given a pr inted form l i s t i n g 
aH possible divisions of the group earnings (Appendix IV). 
The subjects were asked to (v^ ) mark the one division in 
the space provided, which they thought most appropriate for 
each member, in terms of the i r group cont r ibut ions . 
Mtex they had chosen a divis ion, a 5-item ques-
t ionnai re (%)pendix V) was administered to the sub jec t s . 
Subjects recorded t h e i r response to each item on a 7-point 
so ale . 
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Then in a very br ief post experimental interview 
they were requested not to t a lk about the experiment to other 
s tudents as i t would affect the resu l t s of the study, given 
Bs,2/- each, thanked for t h e i r co-operation and the session, 
terminated. The above experimental procedure has been taken 
from the study conducted by Leventhal and Lane (l970) and the 
task performed by the subjects in t h i s study i s s imi lar to 
tha t used by Oohen ( i974) . 
The following hypotheses described in the Mull-
form were se t up for the purpose of t h i s study : 
1. There is no effect of the l e v e l of Socio-economic s ta tus 
of 8 subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
2 . There is no effect of the level of emotional adjustment 
of a subject on the feeling of inequi ty . 
5 . There i s no effect of the level of anxiety of a subject 
on the feeling of inequi ty . 
4 . There is no effect of the level of socio-economic s t a tus 
coupled with level of oaotional adjustment of a subject 
on the feel ing of inequity. 
5 . There i s no effect of the l e v e l of socio-economic s ta tus 
coupled with leve l of anxiety of a subject on the feel ing 
of inequity. 
6. There i s no effect of the leve l of emDtional adjustment 
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coupled with level of anxiety of a subject on the feel ing 
of inequ i ty . 
7 . There i s no effect of the level of socio-economic s ta tus 
coupled with level of emotional adjustment and anxiety of 
a subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
8 . There i s no effect of LSEI coupled with LEA and lA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
9 . There i s no effect of LSEI coupled with LEA and HA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
10. There is no effect of LSSL coupled with HEA and LA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
11. There is no effect of LSEL coupled with HEA and HA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
12. There i s no effect of HSEL coupled with LEA and LA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
13. There i s no effect of HSEL coupled with LEA and HA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
14. There is no effect of HSEL coupledw with HEA and LA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
15. There i s no effect of HSEL coupled with HEA and HA of a 
subject on the feel ing of inequi ty . 
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MALYSIS 
As has been poin ted e a r l i e r , the oDject of t h i s 
s tudy was to t e s t t h e e f f ec t of socio-economic l e v e l , l e v e l 
of emotional adjustment and l e v e l of anxie ty on i n e q u i t y . 
The t h r e e independent va r i ab l e s ~ socio-economic l e v e l (A); 
Buotional adjustment (B); and M x i e t y (c) v/ere each d i cho to -
mised as high and low (A^. Ki \> B ; 0 , G ) . 
The th ree independent v a r i a b l e s were each d iv ided 
i n t o two l e v e l s - a h igher t o t a l score l e v e l and a lower 
t o t a l scoi« l e v e l . This was done by the help of norms p r o v i -
ded in t h e t h r e e t e s t s . 
Thus, e i g h t groups were obta ined each c o n s i s t i n g 
of 10 sub jec t s : 
1. low socio-economic l e v e l , low emotional adjustment and low 
anxi e ty (ISEI-LEA-LA). 
2 . Low socio-economic l e v e l , low emotional adjustment and 
h igh anxiety ( L S E L - L E A - H A ) . 
3 . Low socio-economic l e v e l , h igh ono t iona l adjustment and 
low anx ie ty ( L S E L - H E A - L A ) . 
4-. Low socio-economic l e v e l , h igh emotional adjustment and 
high anxie ty (LSEIr-HEA-HA). 
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5. High socio-economic l e v e l , low emotional adjustment and 
low anx ie ty (HSEL-LEA-LA) . 
6. High socio-economic l e v e l , low emotional adjustment and 
h igh anx ie ty (HSEL-IEA-HA). 
7 . High socio-economic l e v e l , high emotional adjustment and 
low anx ie ty (HSEL-HEA-LA). 
8 . High socio-economic l e v e l , high emotional adjustment and 
h igh anx ie ty (HSEL-HEA-HA). 
In o rde r to determine whether i n e q u i t y was in some 
way affected by the independent va r i ab l e s i n g l y or by t h e i r 
v a r i o u s pos s ib l e combinations of the e igh t groups thus foimed, 
these had to be analysed fo r t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e d i f f e -
rence between t h e i r means c o l l e c t i v e l y and wi th va r ious 
p o s s i b l e combinat ions . This was p o s s i b l e ty applying t h e 
a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e . 
Analysis of var iance i s a s t a t i s t i c a l t oo l developed 
by S i r R.A.Pisher and h i s 8-ssooiateji>. I t s basic purpose i s 
t o t e s t t he s i g n i f i c a n c e of d i f fe rence between two or more 
means. The requirement of t h i s s tudy goes f u r t h e r - i t i s 
a l s o des i red to know how these means d i f f e r . Edwards ( i960) 
p o i n t s ou t " a v a r i e t y of methods have been proposed f o r 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e d i f fe rences e x i s t i n g between a s e t of K 
means. These t e s t s are use fu l whenever we a r e concerned 
w i th mul t ip l e comparisons among the means." Headds, "In 
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making multiple comparisons among the treatment means, i t is 
not necessary that the treatment mean square of the analysis 
of variance be significant." 
In -this study there being three factors (socio-
economic level, emotional adjustment and level of anxiety) 
each with two levels (high and low) a 2x2x2 factorial design 
was applied (Edwards, i960; McGuigan, i960). 
The following steps are used in conducting an 
analysis of variance for the 2x2x2 factorial design: 
To begin the analysis, we f i r s t find the total sum 
of square , then the treatment sum of Squares and then the 
within treatment sum of Squares. The present investigation 
has three factors A, B, and G, each varied in two way A ,^ Ap; 
B , B ; and C , C . The total number of observations is QO, 
10 in each of the subdivided groups of the three main factors, 
A, B, and C. 
The three sums of squares (Ss) ai'e calculated as 
follows : 
Total Ss ="0x^)^ + {x^f + (x^)2 + + Oxyg)^  + (xQ^f -
N 
Treatment Ss = (ix^f (ix^f + + iix^ll iiX^f-
Within Ss = Total Ss - Treatment Ss X^^s/V . y 1 ^ 
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M t e r the sums of Squares (Ss) have been calculated 
we have to calculate the mean squares for a l l the three 
f ac to r s , A, B, and G. These means squares for the levels of 
factors are often called the Main Effects . 
Each of the fsctors or components A, B, and G wil l 
represent a comparison between the two levels of a given 
f a c t o r . Tb ca lcula te the Main Effects of Variable or factor 
A, we have the f i r s t comparison of Variable A. We find the 
sum for : 
For the second comparison of variable B, we find 
the sum for : 
^ = ^ -^  *2 * S * 6^ = 
B, z'S*\*h*'^ 
For the th i rd comparison of variable 0, we find 
the sum for : 
Then we subs t i tu te the above values calculated to 
of 
the following foimula, to find out the Main Effects^all the 
three variable?, A, B, and C. 
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\2 fs^r ^2 
^ \^^  ^^\^ ^^h '^h " "^^ ^^^)' 
A » 1— + 
n n I 
Using the above formula, l i kewi se t h e values of 
v a r i a b l e B and C are a l so s u b s t i t u t e d and t h e Main Ef fec t s 
c a l c u l a t e d of t h e three v a r i a b l e s . 
In add i t i on , to the c a l c u l a t i o n of Main Effects or 
Mean Squares f o r t h e th ree v a r i a b l e s , we have t o c a l c u l a t e 
fo r t h e I n t e r a c t i o n between t h e th ree f a c t o r s . 
A Two-way Table f o r computing an I n t e r c a c t i o n i s 
shown Schemat ical ly r ep resen ted f o r i n t e r a c t i o n of f a c t o r s 
A, B, and C, des ignated A X B, A X G and B X G. 
Two-way Table for A X B : 
B, Bj 
A. a b 
1 
* * v ^ c d 
Where a = the sum f o r A^B = 
1 1 
b » the sum for A.B2= 
c =» the sum for ApB = 
d = the sum for ApB„= 
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S i m i l a r l y , a Two-way Table f o r A X G : 
1-
A a b 
Ap c d 
And, a Two-way T a b l e f o r B X C : 
S =2 
B^ a b 
1 
Bg c d 
and the values for a, b, e, and d are c a l c u l a t e d f o r A X 0 
and B X C as shown f o r A X B. 
After t he Two-way Tables have been cons t ruc t ed fo r 
A X B, A X C, and B X C and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e va lues incorpo-
r a t e d , we c a l c u l a t e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n f o r A X B, A X C, and 
B X C by the fol lowing formula : 
I n t e r a c t i o n = / (a + d) - (b + c ) / 
4n 
After computing i n t e r a c t i o n sum of squares f o r 
81 
factors A X B, A X G, and B X C by the aoove method, we caxi 
ca lcu la te the in terac t ion sum of Squares for A X B X 0. 
To calculate the A X B X 0 in t e raa t ion we see our 
Treatment Ss which is equal to the sum of squares for A, B, 
G, A X B, AX 0, B X G, and A X B X G. Because, ve have 
already calculated a l l of these sums of squares, except 
A X B X G, the l a t t e r can he obtained by sus t rac t ing the 
other s ix sums of squares from the Treatment Ss . 
The value of P for a l l the three f ac to r s , A, B, 
and G and t h e i r in teract ions A X B, A X G, B X G, and A X B X G, 
are obtained by dividing each of the fean Squares t ha t i s to 
be tes ted for significance by the error mean, that i s , the 
within treatment mean square. The within treatment mean 
square i s obtained by dividing the within Ss by the d.f . of 
within t rea tments . 
In analysis of variance the degree of freedom has 
been par t i t ioned into two p a r t s . One part i s associated with 
difference among the eight treatment means and i s based on 
K - 1 = 7 d.f. The other part i s associated with the var ia -
t i on and has K (n - i ) = 72 d.f. 
After the application of P t e s t the EA var iab le of 
the present invest igat ion was found to be s i g n i f i c a n t . As 
EA i s dichotomised in HEA and IBfi^ , the t t e s t was then 
applied to determine whether one l eve l of EA was superior 
to the other. 
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The following formal a was applied to determine the 
t value : 
/ - - / 
t = / X. - X. / 
/ ^ 2 / 
S / 1 + _JL 
S/ n^ n^ 
(MsX^uigan, i960) 
•Where S = / ^ o 
V ^ ' ^2 - 2 
The d .f . for t t e s t i s calculated, as follows 
d.f. = n + n - 2 
The dichotomised group having the higher mean 
value, i s t aicen to be the superior of the two. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AHD INTERPRiirATIONS OF RESULTS 
Equity theory (Adams, l965) s t a t e s tha t person 
tend to maintain propor t ional i ty between t h e i r inputs and 
outcomes and the inputs and outcomes of a comparison o ther . 
Consequently, equity theory proposes that persons who a l l o -
cate Inwards within a group d i s t r ibu te them in proportion to 
each member's contr ibut ions . While th is proposit ion has 
been supported by a number of s tudies , other s tudies have 
fa i l ed to support equity indicat ing tha t rewards are d i s t r i -
buted equally. 
Studies supporting equity over equal i ty have been 
conducted by Leventhal and his associates (leventhal and 
Anderson, 1970, Leventhal and Lane, 1970, Leventhal and 
Michaels, 1969). In these studies where members of a dyad 
made unequal work contr ibut ions , subjects al located the 
reward unequally. In contrast to these studies supporting 
equity over equal i ty , there are s tudies (l^brgan and Sawyer, 
19*^7, Wiggins, 1966) coal i t ion s tudies (reviewed by Gamson, 
1964) which indicate contrary to equity, that even yhen 
inputs are unequal, subjects do a l locate rewards equally. 
These confl ict ing r e s u l t s can be understood by 
reference to s i t u a t i o n a l and socia l factors which differed 
across these s tud ie s . Equity or inequity bas ica l ly i s a 
soc ia l concept as can very well be construed i n the def ini t ion 
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given by Adams (l963)- I t I s only the soc ia l , c u l t u r a l and 
psychological factors which induce the feelings of inequity 
or equi ty . These factors along with the value systems, stage 
of economic development, s t a t e of enployment, remunerations 
or pay grades and the general price l eve l prevalent in a 
country at a pa r t i cu l a r point of time are a l l important 
fac tors to be taken into consideration as far as feel ings 
of inequity are concerned. Man i s not only a r a t i ona l animal 
but also an emotional being. Human behaviour, pa r t i cu l a r l y 
soc ia l human behaviour i s a global concept and i s therefore , 
determined by a large number of factors re levant , r a t i ona l ly 
and emotionally5>to a given s i tua t ion including a host of 
contingent factors . 
The purpose of the present study i s to see how 
socio-economic s t a t u s , l eve l of emotional adjustment and 
level of anxiety affect the reward a l locat ion and the subse-
quent feelings of equity or inequity of co-workers with 
unequal inputs in a t r i a d . 
To s t a r t with, i t may be pointed out tha t the 
subjects of the present study while a l loca t ing rewards, 
i r respec t ive of the i r inputs or performance, socio-economic 
status*emotional adjustment leve ls and t h e i r leve ls of 
anxiety divided i t in 36.25^ of cases according to the 
equity theory. 68 .75?^  of the subjects in the present 
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i n v e s t i g a t i o n d iv ided the reward, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r 
perfonnanee o r t h e i r p a r t n e r ' s ; e q u a l l y (c .f . Tahle 1 .1) . 
TABLE 1.1 
OVER ALL PERCENTAGE OF REWARD ALLOCATION RESPONSE BY THE 
SUBJECTS 
TYPE OF ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE OP REWARD ALLOCATION 
JSquity 
Equality 
36.S25 fo 
63 .75 fo 
Note : Number of suhjects = 80 . 
This broad and simple finding c l e a r l y shows the 
inadequecy of the various assumptions of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e 
as advanced for the various foormulations of equi ty theory^^^ 
mentioned ea r l i e r in th i s discussion. 
The notion that equali ty might be preferred to 
equity i s , in fac t , suggested hy Adams (l965) in discussing 
exchanges other than with an employer. He s ta ted "in a vast 
array of social r e l a t i o n s rec iproc i ty i s a functional element 
of the re la t ion . What is^in fact^referred to by rec iproc i ty 
i s equa l i ty of exchange (p.278)". However, Idams does not 
discuss why equality should be the rule in d i rec t exchanges. 
When the quali ty of performance of the subjects i s 
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cons idered , we f ind t h a t out of the t o t a l number of s u b j e c t s 
(80) , 27 sub jec t s w i th 30?^ inpu t o r performance l e v e l , 7 
s u b j e c t s divided the reward according t o the equ i ty p r i n c i p l e 
and 20 according to the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e . Likewise, 26 
s u b j e c t s w i th 50?^  l e v e l of perfoimance 19 sub jec t s d iv ided 
t h e reward on equ i ty b a s i s and 7 sub jec t s d iv ided the reward 
e q u a l l y . S imi l a r ly , 27 s u b j e c t s w i th 80^ performance l e v e l , 
4 s u b j e c t s d ivided the reward according to equ i ty p r i n c i p l e 
and 24 sub j ec t s divided the reward equal ly (c .f. Table 1 .2) . 
TABLE 1 .2 
OVERALL RE^ A^RD ALLOCATION RESPOISE OF SUBJiCT'S AS A 
FUNCTION OF PERFORMANCE. 
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF SUBJiX:iTS 
27 
26 
27 
LEVEL OF 
PERFORMANCE 
3(^0 
50^ 
80/. 
NO. OF SUBJECTS DIVIDING 
REWARD m THE BASIS OF 
EQUITY IQUALITY 
7 
19 
3 
20 
7 
24 
Before we proceed with the explanation of our 
r e s u l t s , letfA discuss a pecu l i a r i t y in Table 1 .2 . While a 
majority of subjects with 30^ and 80^ leve l of performance 
or input divided the reward equally, why did 19 out of 26 
subjects with 5 0?^  level of performance prefer to divide the 
reward on the equity basis ? These subjects seem to exhibit 
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a greater conoem for the pr inc ip les of d i s t r i b u t i v e ju s t i ce 
than the subjects with ei ther a very high or low level of 
input (8C^ and 3C^ respec t ive ly ) . A l ike ly explanation could 
be that subjeots with an average l eve l of input (50fo) ne i ther 
f e l t gu i l t y at contr ibuting less to the group earnings nor 
f e l t over gsnerous for contr ibuting qui te highly to the group 
earnings, and ee such preferred to follow the pr inciples of 
equity over equa l i ty . 
In planning the present study personal i ty fac tors 
l i k e emotional ad;)ustment and anxiety have been kept in mind. 
Most of the invest igat ions of equity behaviour have studied 
the effect of such soc ia l and environmental factors as perfor-
mance, socio-economic s t a t u s , soc ia l f a c i l i t a t i o n , factors in 
small group dynamics, expectations, l ik ing e t c . , neglecting 
almost completely personal i ty factors which are being studied 
by the present i nves t iga to r . I t i s obvious tha t socia l 
factors have a pre t ty good effect on behaviour in groups, 
yet personal i ty factors do influence soc ia l behaviour by 
themselves as well as in conjunction with a host of s i t u a -
t i ona l factors . 
Although the application of the F t e s t on the data 
obtained by the 5-item questionnaire has shown level of socio-
economic s ta tus and level of anxiety as ins ign i f i can t as wil l 
be c lea r while we proceed fur ther with our analyses, yet we 
can very well see in Table 1 .3 how different combinations of 
socio-economic s t a t u s , level of emotional adjustment with 
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l eve l of anxiety r e su l t in giving tremendous sh i f t to the 
basis of reward al locat ion on the par t of our subjects . 
TABLE 1 .3 
PERCEHTAGE OP EEWMD ALLOC IT ION RESPONSE OF THE TRIADS ON 
THE BiSIS OP IQUAirE/AHD BJUITT. 
TRIADS 
LSED - ISA -
LSEI - LEA -
LSEL - HEA -
LSEL - HEA -
HSEL - LEA -
HSEL - LEA -
HSEL - HEA -
HSEL - HEA -
• LA 
HA 
LA 
HA 
HA 
HA 
LA 
HA 
TYPES OP 
ALLOCATION 
Equality-
Equi ty 
Equa l i ty 
Equity 
Equa l i ty 
Equi ty 
Equa l i ty 
Equi ty 
Equa l i ty 
Equity 
Equa l i ty 
Equi ty 
Equa l i ty 
Equity 
Equa l i ty 
Equity 
PERCENTAGE OP 
REWARD ALLOCATION 
90^ 
^oofo 
Ofo 
20fo 
aofo 
eofo 
30/0 
90fo 
10/0 
0/9 
100^ 
60^ 
405!^  
Note : N In each c e l l e 1O, 
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Table 1.3 shows that when subjects with ISEI-LEA-LA 
al located rewards, SOfo of them allocated in accordance with 
equali ty norm and 10^ of them adhered to the equity norm, 
subjects with LSEL-LEA-HA d is t r ibu ted the rewards on the 
basis of the equal i ty noitn in 100^ of cases , none of the 
subjects in t h i s group divided the reward on the bas is of 
equity p r i n c i p l e . The two groups have the same SEL (low) 
and same EA (low) but differred only in t he i r l eve l of 
anxiety. The data obtainiii points out c lear ly that low 
anxiety has a s l i g h t effect on the subjects , because 10^ of 
them have shown a concern for the pr inciples of equity, but 
the percentage i s too small to be of much consequence. But 
in the next group we see, subjects with LSEL-LEA-HA have 
divided the reward only on the basis of equali ty p r inc ip l e , 
completely disregarding the equity norm. This points out 
c l ea r l y that though low anxiety leve l had an effect , i t was 
very s l i gh t , the subjects were more influenced with the i r 
low-socio-economic s t a t u s , low emotional adjustment and high 
anxiety, therefore more concerned with the socia l react ions 
to 
of o ther members of the peer group^which they belong. They 
also seem to be perhaps more concerned with self-ima^e 
building and ego-defence and therefore, wanting to project a 
favourable image of themselves, thus, dividing the reward on 
the basis of the equal i ty pr inc ip le and completely overlooking 
the equity p r i n c i p l e . 
Here we can see that over hypotheses Nos . 8 and 9 
"have been re jec ted . 
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Let us take the next two groups in Table 1 .3 , namely 
LSEIr-HEA-LA and ISEIr-HEA-HA. We see that these groups sre 
diss imi lar than the f i r s t two above discussed groups in 
having high emotional adjustment (HEA) of the subjects . The 
data obtained points out c lea r ly t h a t subjects with high 
emotional adjustment have shown a much greater concern for 
the pr inciple of ' d i s t r i bu t ive j u s t i c e ' and al located rewards 
according to the equity norm. The group having LSEL-HEA-LA 
have divided the reward in 20^ of cases equally and in SOfo 
of cases on equity basis . In the LSEL-HEi-HA group, the 
subjects have divided the reward in SOfo of cases according 
to equality and in 40^ of eases according to the equity 
p r i n c i p l e . In the l a t e r group, we see that HEA did excert 
coiasiderable influence on the reward al locat ion behaviour, 
but i t could not be too much as the subjects were more highly 
influenced by t h e i r LSBL and HA. Whereas in the foimer group 
the effect of LSEI was comparatively less because the subjects 
had HEA and lA, thus giving them the impetus to divide the 
reward in 80^ of cases according to the equity p r i n c i p l e . I t 
can be said tha t subjects with high emotional adjustment and 
low anxiety level seem, obviously, to be l ess concerned with 
the social reactions of other members of the peer group to 
which they belong. They also seem to be, perhaps, much less 
concerned with image building and ego-defence and therefore, 
more objective in t h e i r reward al locat ion behaviour in which 
inputs/outputs determine the bas i s on which rewards are 
d i s t r ibu ted (equi ty) . 
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The hypotheses nos . lO and 11 are re jected on the 
bas i s of the above explanations . 
Coming to the t r i ad s in the HSEI^ LSA-LA group, the 
oo-workers allocated rewards in 70^ of cases as cording to the 
equal i ty norm and followed the equity norm in 50^ of cases. 
In the next group of t r i a d s , ESEL-LM-EA^ we see tha t the 
co-woriceiB have divided the reward in 90^ of cases according 
to the equal i ty pr inciple and only in 10^ of cases according 
to the equity norm. Here we find that high-socio-economic 
leve l and low-emotional adjustment are common to both the 
groups, they only differ in the i r l eve l of anxiety. In the 
former*, group the secur i ty generated by high-socio-economic 
s ta tus and the low leve l of anxiety has given the subjects 
the impetus to divide the reward in 3C^ of cases according to 
the pr inc ip les of ' d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e ' . The 70^ of the 
times when th i s group has preferred to divide the reward 
according to the equal i ty pr inciple can be understood as the 
effect of low emotional adjustment which made them concerned 
with the social reactions of other members of the peer group 
to which they belonged and the effect of a l t r u i s t i c p r inc ip l e . 
The high socio-economic s ta tus of the subjects made them 
projec t a social image in consonance with the reputat ion and 
pres t ige usually enjoyed and projected by persons belongi i^ 
to hig^ socio-economic s t a t u s . In the l a t e r group the low 
leve l of emotional adjustment, high anxiety and the effect 
of a l t r u i s t i c pr inciple made the t r i ads of th i s group^ 
92 
HSEL-LEA-HA, divide the reward in 90% of cases according to 
the equali ty p r i n c i p l e . S t i l l 1C^ of the subjects of t h i s 
group have al located the reward according to the equity-
p r inc ip l e , t h i s can he explained in terms of a s l i gh t effect 
of the feel ing of securi ty generated by the high socio-
economic s ta tus but i t was not so strong as to overcome the 
effect of the other two negative var iables , namely LEA and 
HA. 
Here again we see tha t our hypotheses nos . 12 and 
13 have been rejected. 
The analysis of the next t r i ad s show a drast ic 
sh i f t in the i r reward al locat ion response. The t r i a d with 
HSEE-HBA-LA, a group coming from a high socio-economic s t a tus , 
having high emotional adjustment and low leve l of anxiety, 
a l l plus points , are shown c lea r ly in t h e i r division of the 
reward. This group has in iOO% of cases divided the reward 
according to the equity p r inc ip le , showing a complete d i s -
regard for the pr inc ip le of equal d i s t r i b u t i o n . This group 
seems to be leas t concerned about project ing a favourable 
self-image, show no problems of soc ia l in te rac t ion ; they do 
not feel that t h e i r self-esteem and t h e i r position in the 
peer group wil l be threatened. They seem to have made 
themselves the chums of the peer group and as such have just 
considered the pr inciple of ' d i s t r i b u t i v e ^ s t i c e ' or equity 
as the sole c r i t e r i a of dividing the reward. But we see a 
difference in the reward allocation of the next group of 
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t r i a d s . Here we hsve HSEL-HEA-HA, the co-v/orkers have 
f o i l owe a the equali ty principle in 60fo ol' cases and the 
equity norm in 4.0fo of cases . This group's high l eve l of 
anxiety and the i r subsequent need to project an a l t r u i s t i c 
a t t i t ude to go with t h e i r high socio-economic s ta tus made 
them divide the rev/ard in SO'jf, of cases according to the 
equal i ty p r inc ip le , though high emotional adjustment has 
led them to al locate the reward in at l ea s t 40?S of cases 
according to the equity norm. 
The Hypotheses nos .14 and 15 have been rej ected. 
Table 1 .4 shows how the three independent var iables , 
namely socio-economic s ta tus , emotional adjustment and 
anxiety, influenced the reward al locat ion behaviour in 
conjunction with tne l e v e l of performance of the subjects . 
The most outstanding feature of t h i s analysis i s tha t the 
superior performers (SOfo l eve l of performance) of a l l possi-
ble combinations of the independent variable except the 
HSEL-HEA-IA group have divided the reward according to the 
equali ty p r inc ip l e . A study conducted by leventhal and Lane 
(l970) using prescholars male and female subjects have also 
come to similar conclusions, that females and spec ia l ly 
superior perfoimers tended to follow the equality norm in 
t h e i r reward al locat ion response. The reason for the 
i n a b i l i t y of the HSEL-HEA-IA group to follow the equal i ty 
norm has been discussed e a r l i e r (c .f . page 9 2). 
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TABLE 1 .4 
TYPE OP EEMAED ALLOCATION BY THE TRIADS OF THE BASIS OP 
PERPO MANGE. 
TBI ADS 
LSEI^LEA-LA 
LSEL-LEA-HA 
LSEL-HEA-LA 
LSEL-HEA-HA 
HSEIr-LEA-LA 
HSEL-LEA-HA 
HSEL-HEA-LA 
HSElr-HEA-HA 
LEVEL OP 
PBRPORMANCE 
30fo 
5C^ 
80% 
30^ 
5C^ 
80fo 
30fo 
50% 
80fo 
30/0 
50^ 
80?^ 
30% 
50fo 
80fo 
30fo 
50fo 
80^ 
30^ 
50fo 
80% 
3% 
5(¥ 
8 0/0 
NO. OP 
SUBJECTS 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
TYPE OP 
EQUITY 
-
1 
-
-
-
-
4 
3 
1 
-
3 
-
-
2 
-
-
1 
-
4 
3 
3 
1 
3 
-
ALLOCATION 
JEQUALITY 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
3 
-
-
2 
3 
-
4 
3 
1 
4 
3 
3 
3 
-
-
-
2 
1 
3 
Note : N in each ce l l 10 
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Mter the subjects tiad d i s t r ibu ted the rewards 
they -were given a 5-item quest ionnaire. Subjects recorded 
t h e i r response to each item on a 7-point ra t ing scale cons is t -
ing of a row of 61 divisions which allowed them to respond 
in tenths of a u n i t . The actual perfoimance of the subjects 
shows that they did not respond to the f iner divis ions within 
a uni t DUt r^ponded in terms of whole uni ts i . e . from 0 to 
6 on the 7-point s c a l e . Responses to th i s questionnaire were 
subjected to the F t e s t of variance, the resu l t of xvhich g-jije 
tabulated in TaDle 2 . 1 . Variable emotional adjustment (B) 
was found to oe s ignif icant on the I I , I I I and IV items of 
the quest ionnaire, wiiich necessi tated the running of t - t e s t 
through these responses only. Results of running the t - t e s t 
on t he responses to the three questions regarding var iable B 
are given in Table 2 .2 . The F t e s t has also shown that there 
i s no s ignif icant interact ion between the three va r i ab les , 
1, B and G, which i s also given in Table 2 . 1 . 
Responses to the 5-item questionnaire help the 
inves t iga to r in identifying the nouns of jfiistribution followed 
by a given subject , e . g . , a subject responding to question I 
may t ick mark at 6 (grea t ly) showing that the had great ly 
taken account of perfoimance while dividing the reward. I t 
may mean any of the three a l te rna t ives that the subject was 
grea t ly concerned with her own performance o r tha t of her 
par tner or that of both of them. Again i t may mean that the 
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TABLE 2 .1 
OVERALL VALUE OF P FOR 1HE RESPONSES TO QUESTIOMAIRE ITEMS 
AS A HJNCTIOU OP SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL, EMOTIONAL AI)JUSE4ENT, 
AND AMIETI. 
ITEMS VARIABLES 
B t C | A X B |AXC |BXC |AXBXC 
1 . Did you t ake acooimt 
of perfonnanoe when 2 .78 - 2 .43 - 1 .04 1 -04 
d i v i d i n g the reward? 
* 
2 . How did your p e r -
formance compare . ^-^ .r, 
to t h a t of your " 4.&1 1-4^ 
p a r t n e r s ? 
3 . Was q u a l i t y of your ^ 
work s i m i l a r to « -^7 o nc o A-Z. 
t h a t of your - 8.57 - - - 2.05 2-43 
4 . 
5 . 
par tners ? 
Would you l ike to 
have the same 
partnera in a 
fur ther study ? 
Did you consider 
the effect of your 
division of the 
reward on your 
pa r tne r ' s opinion 
of you ? 
* 
- 4.88 
_ _ 2.35 
* s i g n i f i c m t a t .05 l e v e l . 
+ s i g n i f i c a n t at .01 l e v e l . 
poor peirfoimance of h e r p a r t n e r was taken in to c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o r h e r own poor performance might have been t aken i n t o c o n s i -
d e r a t i o n , depending on how the two p a r t n e r s a c t u a l l y perfoimed. 
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HoA(\? on the bas is of th is considerat ion, the reward was 
actual ly d is t r ibuted shows the norms governing the reward 
al locat ion behaviour of the a l l o c a t o r s . I t i s r igh t here 
tha t a proper account has to be taken of the other variables 
l i k e socio-economic level , emotional adjustment and leve l of 
anxiety and such other f ac to r s . The present inves t iga t ion 
takes into consideration only the three var iab les , namely, 
socio-economic l eve l , emotional adjustment and anxiety (SJEL, 
EA and AX, respect ively) , an analysis of the data tha t has 
been done in the previous pages and also the analysis tha t 
follows has mainly been focussed around these three var iab les . 
Table 2.1 gives the values of P on variables A, B 
and C i .e . socio-economic level or s t a t u s , emotional adjust-
ment and anxiety respec t ive ly . On item I the value of F for 
var iab le A, B and C and t h e i r inter::?action has been found to 
be ins ign i f i can t . I t means that these variables did not 
influence the subjects to take into considerat ion the perfor-
mance of the i r partners and t h e i r own input while a l loca t ing 
the rewai^d. This r e s u l t can be seen in the subjects a l loca -
t ion behaviour where 63.75^ of them have preferred theequal i ty 
norm to the equity norm. Had they preferred the equity norm, 
leve l of perfoimance of t h e i r pa r tne r ' s and themselves would 
have been the c r i t e r i a to divide the reward. 
The I I and I I I items measured the subjects 
assessment of inputs , analysing the item I I of the 
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quest ionnaire , we find that the P values of var iable B i s 
(4.61 J> .05) whereas the in terac t ion of these three var ia -
bles was found to be i n s ign i f i c an t . The F values of variable 
A and G was also found to be ins igni f icant for item I I . 
Here we see that subjects with e i ther high or low emotional 
adjustment engaged in cognitive d i s to r t ion to reduce the 
inequity created by t h e i r fa i lure to take more reward for 
themselves* Application of t - t e s t wi l l sbDW >^o "evel of 
emotional ad;]ustiient inc(al|^ed in t h i s cognitive d i s to r t ion . 
Similarly item I I I of the questional re shows the 
P values of A and C to be ins ign i f i can t , while variable B 
i s s ignif icant (8 .57 > .O1) here the subjected judged the i r 
wo]± to be s ign i f ican t ly more similar to tha t of t h e i r 
p a r t n e r , although the in te rac t ion of the three variables 
was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . This resu l t indicates tiaat subjects with 
e i ther high or low level of emotional adjustment did not 
exaggerate the difference between t h e i r own inputs and those 
of t h e i r p a r t n e r s . Such cognitive d l s to ra t ion would have 
led them to take a veiy small share of reward, and as such 
they preferred to divide i t in majority of cases equally. 
One reason such d is tor t ion did not occur may be tha t the 
subjects were re luctant to underoestimate t h e i r inputs 
because t h e i r self-esteem would have been threatened (Adams, 
1965; Leventhal and Anderson, 1970). 
Analysis of item I ? shows tha t the I values of 
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variable 1 and C were insignif icant but the variable B was 
s igni f icant ( 4.88 !> .05 ) , therebyjindicat ing tha t subjects 
with high o r low leve l of emotional adjustment were a t t rac ted 
towards t he i r partners and would not mind them as future 
par tners in another s tudy. The in te rac t ion effect of these 
three variables was i n s ign i f i c an t . 
On item V and F values of al l the three variables 
and t h e i r in te rac t ion was^  found to be i n s ign i f i can t . This 
indicates that the subjects had not taicen in to consideration 
t h e i r partners opinion on the i r divis ion of reward. Had the 
suDjeets been dividing rewards according to the norm of 
'd i s t r iDut ive j u s t i c e ' they would have been much nDi-e 
concerned with t h e i r par tner ' s opinion of them. 
The overall findings of th i s study suggests tha t 
as the subjects belonged to the same college f r a t e r n i t y , 
t h e i r a l locat ion decisions were influenced by the equal i ty 
norm. The equal i ty norm was followed by the a l locator 
because i t fos ters harmony and so l ida r i ty (Bales, 1950) also 
equal d i s t r ibu t ion tends to produce a high l eve l of s a t i s -
faction and harmony among group members ( e . g . Ju l i an and 
Perry, 1967; Smith and Cooic, 1973, Steiner, 1972). The 
r e s u l t s of the present study indicate tha t in ce r t a in type 
of soc ia l se t t ing equali ty norm influences the a l l oca to r ' s 
decisions, and is s imilar to the r e su l t s obtained by Garrett , 
1973, Kahn, iy72; Lane and Goon, 1972; Leventhal, Popp and 
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Sawyer, 1978; Lie htm an, 1972; P r u i t t , i972; Sampson, i969; 
l e m e r , i974a- The equali ty norm i s spec ia l ly followed in 
se t t ings where i t i s widely regarded as the most appropriate 
ru le of al locat ion and others expect the a l loca tor to follow 
i t . 
This study dealt only with female col lege students 
as subjec ts , and 3?eachf>d the conclusion that majority of the 
subjects preferred the equali ty norm even when the inputs of 
the co-vorkers of the t r i a d was dif ferent or regardless of 
i n i t i a l differences in con t r ibu t ions . Tinacke and h is 
associates (Bond and Vinacke, 1961; Uesugi and ?inacke, 1963; 
Vinacke, 1962) also found that females partners tended to 
follow the equal i ty norm moiB than the male pa r tne r s . They 
accounted for these r e su l t s bj suggesting that female groups 
prefer equali ty because they are more concerned than males 
about preserving harmor^ and s o l i d a r i t y . 
The F values of three out of the 5'-questionnaire 
items being s ignif icant on variable B, the next necessary 
step was that of running the t in order to find out which of 
the two levels (high (B ) o r low (B )) was influencing the 
reward a l locat ion behaviour of our subjects in a s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s igni f icant manner. Taule 2.2 give the mean scale values of 
responses for groups Bp and B and the value of t for each 
item of the quest ionnaire . 
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TABLE 2 . 2 
MEM SCAIiE VAIUE MD t-VALUE OP THE RESPONSE TO QUESTIOMAIRE 
ITEMS AS A PMGTION OF HIGH - LOW EMOTIONAL ADJUSTI4ENT LEVEL 
(^2 -^  ^1 > 
ITEMS MEAN SCALE VALUE ^ _ ^^^^^ 
zz _\ 
1 . Did you take account 3 42 3-56 0.93 
of perfonnance y^hen 
d i v i d i n g t h e reward? 
2 . How did your p e r f o r - 3.53 4-43 2.3O* 
mance compare to t h a t 
of your p a r t n e r ? 
3 . Was q u a l i t y of your 3-35 4-53 4-76+ 
work s i m i l a r to t h a t 
of your p a r t n e r s ? 
4 . Would you l i k e to have 3 .30 4-30 2 . 3 3 * 
t h e same p a r t n e r i s a 
f u r t h e r s tudy ? 
5 . Did you cons ider t h e 3.65 4-0 0.96 
e f f e c t of your d i v i s i o n 
of the reward on your 
p a r t n e r ' s op in ion of 
you ? 
* S i g n i f i c a n t a t .05 l e v e l . 
+ S i g n i f i c a n t at .01 l e v e l . 
The va lue of t on item I and V were found to he 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Now l e t us cons ider t h e t values of i tems 
I I and I I I , both of which measure 4- sub j ec t s assessment of 
i n p u t s . On i tem I I t h e t value i s (2.3O > .05) which i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t . The mean sca l e value of B i s 4-43 which i s 
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greater than the mean scale value of B , 5.53- 3?he data 
indicate tha t subjects with low emotional adjustment engaged 
in cognitive d i s tor t ion to reduce the inequity created by 
t h e i r fa i lu re to follow the equity p r inc ip le , thus taking 
less reward f o r themselves if t h e i r performance was superior 
or taking more reward for i n fe r io r perfoimance because they 
followed the equality norm instead of the equity norm. 
On item I I I the t value i s (4.76 )> -01) which i s 
s igni f icant and the mean scale value of B i s greater than 
that of Bp (4.53 and 3.35 respec t ive ly ) . This r e s u l t ind i -
cates that the low emotional adjustment subjects did not 
exaggerate the difference between iiieir own inputs and that 
of t h e i r pa r tne r s . The explanation given e a r l i e r (c .f . 98) 
holds good here too . 
The t value of item lY was also s igni f icant 
(2.35 y .05) and the mean scale value of B was grea ter 
than that of B^ (4-30 and 3 .3O) respect ive ly) subjects with 
low emotional adjustment f e l t more a t t r ac ted towards t h e i r 
p a r t n e r s . One reason for the i r prefererice for the same 
partners in a fuiijher study could be that having divided 
the reward equally they f e l t that they wi l l be eas i ly 
acceptable to t h e i r partners in future as they had not 
generated antagonism and tension by a l locat ing the rewards 
on the basis of merit or on the bas is of equity norm. 
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This discussion leads us to conclude with the 
re jec t ion of hypothesis no .2 and acceptance of hypotheses 
n o . l , 3 . 4 , 5, 6 and 7. 
CHAPTER V 
GOUGLUSIOBS 
The CO I l lus ions arr ived on the basis of the find-
ings of the reward a l locat ion behaviour of the subjects of 
th i s study are as follows : 
1. 63.73% of t he to ta l subjects allocated the rewards accord-
ing to the equali ty norm and 36.25^ according to the equity 
norm. 
2 . (a) Out of 27 subjects with 30^ level of performance, 7 
subjects allocated the reward according to equity 
norm and 20 subjects according th the equal i ty norm. 
(b) Out of the 26 subjects with 30fo level of performance, 
19 subjects allocated the reward according to the 
equity norm and 7 subjects according to the equal i ty 
norm. 
(c ) Out of the 27 subjects with 80% leve l of performance, 
3 subjects al located the reward according to the 
equity noim and 24 subjects according to the equal i ty 
norm. 
3 . (a) 90% of the LSEL - lEA - lA subjects al located the 
reward according to the equality norm. 
(b) 10% of the LSEL-LEA-LA subjects a l located the reward 
according to the equity norm. 
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(c ) 100=^  of the ISEIr-IEA~HA s u b j e c t s a l l o c a t e d t h e reward 
according to the e q u a l i t y norm. 
(d) 0^ of t h e ISEL-ISA-HA s u b j e c t s a l l o c a t e d t h e reward 
according t o the equ i ty norm. 
(e) 20fo of t h e LSEI-HBA-M s u b j e c t s a l l o c a t e d t h e reward 
according to the ^ q u a l i t y norm. 
( f ) 80^ of the LSEL-HEA-LA sub jec t s a l l o c a t e d the reward 
according to t h e e q u i t y norm. 
(g) 6C^ of t h e LSEL-HEA-HA s u b j e c t s a l l o c a t e d the reward 
according to the equa l i t y norm. 
(h) 40^ of the LSEL-HEA-HA s u b j e c t s a l l oca t ed the reward 
according to the equ i ty norm. 
( i ) 70^ of the HSEL-LEA-LA s u b j e c t s a l l o c a t e d t h e rewai'd 
according t o the e q u a l i t y norm. 
(j ) 3C^ of the HSEL-LEA-LA sub jec t s a l l o c a t e d the reward 
a3C02?ding to the equ i ty norm. 
(k ) 90^ of the HSEL-LEA-HA s u b j e c t s a l l o c a t e d t h e reward 
according t o the e q u a l i t y noim. 
(1) 1C^ of the HSEL-LEA-HA sub j ec t s a l l o c a t e d the rewai'd 
a3cording to the equ i ty norm. 
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(m) Ofoof the HSEL-HEA-IA subjects allocated the reward 
according to the equal i ty norm. 
(n) 100% of the HSEL-HEA-LA subjects al located the reward 
according to the equity norm. 
(o) 605!^  of the HSEIr-HEA-HA subjects al located the reward 
according to the equality norm. 
(p) 40% of the HSEIr-HEA-HA subjects a l located the reward 
according to the equity norm. 
The 5-item questionnaire was administered in rmr 
order to find out, to what extent performance or input/output 
r a t i o , as proposed by Adams (1965) and others in defining 
inequi ty and explaining pr inciples of ' d i s t r i bu t i ve j u s t i c e ' , 
actual ly influenced the reward al locat ion behaviour of the 
subjects of t h i s s tudy. Although on only 3 out of the 5-items, 
the findings are s igni f icant , yet i s i s obvious, as explained 
i n the analysis of these and other f indings, tha t in most of 
the cases pr inc ip les o r norms, other than the norms of 
' d i s t r i b u t i v e Isk j u s t i c e ' were governing the reward a l loca-
t ion behaviour of the subjects of th i s study. 
The findings on the 5-item questionnaiire are as 
follows : 
Item - 1. 
(a) SEL did not influence the reward a l loca t ion behaviour 
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of our subjects in talcing perfoimance into consideration, 
(P = 2.78, p ^ . 0 5 ) . 
(b) EA did not influence the reward al locat ion behaviour, in 
taking performance into account. 
(c) iX did not influence the reward a l locat ion behaviour in 
talcing account of performance, (P = 2.43, P> ^ •05)' 
{&) The in terac t ion effect of MB, AXG, BIG, and AXBXC did 
not influence the division of reward in talcing account 
of performance. 
Item - 2 . 
(a) SSL did not influence the reward a l locat ion behaviour of 
the subjects incomparing the i r own perfoimance with t ha t 
of t h e i r paretners . 
(h) EA influenced the reward al location behaviour of the 
subjects , in comparing t h e i r own performance with tha t 
of t h e i r par tners , (F = 4 .6 i , p ^ .05). 
(c) AX did not influence the reward al locat ion behaviour of 
the subjects in comparing t h e i r own perfoimance with 
t h a t of t h e i r p a r t n e r s . 
(d) The in te rac t ion effect of AXB, UQ, BXG and AXBXC did 
not influence the subjects, in comparing t h e i r own 
perfoimance with what of the i r pa r t ne r s . 
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Item - 3 . 
(a) SEL did not influence the reward a l loca t ion behaviour of 
the subjects , in taking into account the qua l i ty of t h e i r 
performance and that of the i r pa r tne r s . 
(b) EA influenced the reward al location behaviour of the 
subjects, in taMng account of the qua l i t y of t h e i r 
performance and tha t of t h e i r pa r tne rs , (1=8.57, p >• .Ol) . 
(c) AX did not influence the reward a l loca t ion behaviour of 
the subjects in talcing account of the qua l i ty of t h e i r 
performance and -feat of t he i r p a r t n e r s . 
(d) The in ter action effect of AXB, AXG, BXC and AXBXG did 
not influence the subjec ts , in taking in to account the 
qual i ty of t h e i r perfoimance and tha t of t h e i r pa r t ne r s . 
Item - 4 . 
(a) SEL did not inf lueice the reward a l locat ion behaviour 
of the subjects , in wanting to have the same partners in 
a further studyof t h i s type. 
(b) EJA influenced the reward allocation behaviour of the 
subjec ts , in wanting to have the same par tners in a 
fur ther study of th i s type, (F= 4.88, p > .05) . 
(c) AX did not influence the regard a l loca t ion behaviour of 
the subjects, inw wanting to have the same partners in a 
fur ther study of th is type. 
109 
(d) The in terac t ion effect of IXB, AXG, BXG and iXBXG did not 
influence the reward al locat ion behaviour of the subjects , 
in -wanting to have the same partners in a further study 
of t h i s type. 
Item - 3 . 
(a) SEL did not influence the reward a l loca t ion behaviour of 
the subjects , in taking into account the opinion of t he i r 
par tners of the al location on reward. 
(b) EA did not influence the subjects , in taking into account 
the opinion of t h e i r pa r te r s on the al location of reward. 
(c) AX did not influence the subjects , in taking into accoimt 
the opinion of the i r partners on the al location of reward, 
(F = 2.33, P < .05) . 
(d) The in te rac t ion effect of AXB, AXG, BXG and AICBXG did not 
influence the subjec ts , in taking in to account the opinion 
of t h e i r partners on the a l locator of reward. 
When the effect of the level of emotional adjustment 
was d i f f e r e n t i a t e a . i t was iound tha t on three -'(tmes, of the 
5-item quest ionnaire, low emotional adjustment was found to be 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s igni f icant in influencing the reward a l loca t ion 
behaviour of t h e subjects in t h i s study. 
S U G G E S T I O I S 
The present investigator feels that there is more 
scope for the study of this particular problem, specially in 
the Indian cultural, social and political context and offers 
the following suggestions: 
1. There is need for field studies on this problem 
than experimental ones, 
2, As most of the studies have been conducted on 
college or preschool and school subjects, we may 
find more interceting results if we study a 
different kind of sample. 
3.' In this type of study, the subjects of both the 
sexes should be taken as the investigator feels 
that males would have differed. It is known that 
boys and girls differ in their expectations and 
reactions due to cultural conditioning. 
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APBENDIX IV 
Write down the contributions made by your partners and 
yourself: 
A = 
B = 
c = 
Together the three of you have earned Rs.6/- as monetary 
reward for the work you have done. Below are given 21 possible 
divisions of the group earnings (Rs.6/-). Read through them 
carefully and tick mark ( \/ ) ^^® division of money you think 
most appropriate for the contributions or inputs that you and 
your partners have made. 
TO ME 
(With 80j5 i n p u t ) 
Rs . 6.00p 
R s . 5.25P 
Rs . 4.75P 
R s . 4.00p 
Rs . 3.25P 
Rs . 2.40p 
R s . 2.00p 
TO MY PARTNER 
(With 80?J i n p u t ) 
Rs . O.OOp 
R s . 0.25P 
R s . 0.50p 
Rs . 0.75P 
Rs . 1.00p 
Rs . 1.50p 
R s . 2.00p 
TO MY PARTMEff 
(With 8O9S i n p u t ) 
R s . O.OOp 
Rs . O.5OP 
Rs . 0.75P 
R s . 1.25P 
Rs . 1.75P 
Rs . 2.10p 
Rs . 2.00p 
TO MY PARTNER 
(With 30% i n p u t ) 
Rs . O.OOp 
Rs . 0 .50p . 
Rs . 0.75P 
Rs . 1.25P 
Rs . 1.75P 
Rs. 2.10p 
Rs . 2.00p 
TO ME 
(With 50% i n p u t ) 
Rs. 6.00p 
Rs . 5.25P 
Rs . 4.75P 
Rs. 4.00p 
Rs . 3.25P 
Rs . 2.40p 
Rs . 2.00p 
TO MY PARTNER 
(With 30% i n p u t ) 
Rs . O.OOp 
Rs . 0.25p 
R s . 0,50p 
Rs . 0.75P 
Rs . I.OOp 
Rs . 1.50p 
Rs. 2.00p 
TO MY PARTNER 
(With 30^ i n p u t ) 
Rs . O.OOp ( ) 
Rs . 0.25p ( ) 
Rs . 0.50p ( ) 
Rs . 0.75P ( ) 
Rs . I.OOp ( ) 
Rs . 1.50p ( ) 
Rs . 2.00p ( ) 
TO MY PARTNER 
(With 30?S i n p u t ) 
Rs . O.OOp ( ) 
Rs . 0.50p ( ) 
Rs . 0.75P ( ) 
Rs . 1.25P ( ) 
Rs . 1.75P ( ) 
Rs . 2.10p ( ) 
Rs . 2.00p ( ) 
TO ME 
(With 30% i n p u t ) 
Rs . 6.00p ( } 
Rs . 5.25P { ) 
Rs . 4.75P ( ) 
Rs . 4.00p ( ) 
Rs . 3.25P ( ) 
Rs . 2.40p ( ) 
Rs . 2.00p ( ) 
iPPEfflPIX - V 
Answer the fol lowing f i ve q u e s t i o n s , keeping in mind 
your performance and your p a r t n e r ' s performance. There a re seven 
a l t e r n a t i v e answer, t i c k t h e one you think answers t h e ques t ion b e s t : 
(^) Lid you taice account of performance when d i v i d i n g the rewards^ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 e 5 0 0 0 0 
fi»iitittittArtitiiiitiAiitiii(!ifrtiittitiitfAtiitit«iriAiti»iit!i»A 
not only ffeirly s u f f i - q u i t e almost g r e a t l y 
a t a l l j u s t c i e n t l y . a l o t f u l l y 
(2) How did your performance compare to t h a t of your p a r t n e r s ? 
0 1 2 5 4 5 6 
f 5 0 (1 5 § } 
n t I l t l I l t t l ? > t ! l » l t l l f t | V f f t t t ! f ! l t f t t t t l l l » f t t 0 t f l t t f t t I l f t t t l t t t f t t t Q 
much j u s t l i t t l e same as f a i r l y q u i t e much 
worse b e t t e r b e t t e r mine b e t t e r b e t t e r b e t t e r 
(3) Was q u a l i t y of your work s i m i l a r to t h a t of your p a r t n e r s ? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 5 0 0 (i iS 0 
ftiiiTit«tifftititttiittftiiff»tftfiAtf»ritftttAtiitf»»iitfiffiiiTtiiit 
n o t s l i g h t l y l i t t l e s u f f i c i - f a i r l y qu i t e veyy 
a t a l l same same e n t l y same s i m i l a r s i m i l a r s i m i l a r 
(4) Would you l i ke t o have the same p a r t n e r s in a f u r t h e r s tudy ? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 !5 0 0 0 § 0 
j J i t i T i i f i i f S t t i t f t t i i f f t t t i t t f i t i f A t t f i i i t i i i A r r i i f t i T r i f t i i i f i i t i i i r t 
ITo some- f a i r l y o f ten q u i t e more always 
t imes o f ten o f ten of ten 
(5) Did you consider t h e e f f e c t of your d i v i s i o n of the reward on 
3'-our p a r t n e r ' s opinion of JOVL ? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
() () 0 il i) 5 § 
R i i i i t t t i t f f t i i f t t t t i i f ^ t i t t t t f i i t A i t t i i t i t i t f i i i i t t i t i i t A i f i t t i i t t t A 
no"t only f a i r l y s u f f i c i - q u i t e nea r ly always 
a t a l l j u s t e n t l y a l o t always 
